How can China and the U.S. build trust in a time of rising geopolitical tensions?
Themes: challenges facing Sino-American relations under Trump; history of China-US relations; cooperation on global challenges; China-US economic competition; potential international communication channels.
Published: April 2025
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Response 1 of 2
Dr. Sun Chenghao Fellow, Head of U.S.-Europe Program, Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University
How to Stabilise China-U.S. R elations In the Second Trump Administration
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has brought significant challenges for China-U.S. relations, a bilateral relationship already fraught with tensions. As Trump doubles down on his hallmark “America First” policies, both sides must navigate a challenging period. The two countries should consider actionable pathways for stabilising the bilateral relationship, which is crucial for global peace and prosperity.
Challenges for China-U.S. Relations Under Trump 2.0
Under Trump’s second term, China-U.S. relations face heightened competition across economic, political, and security dimensions.
Trump’s rhetoric and actions during his first term suggested that economic and technology decoupling will be a central pillar of his China strategy. A renewed focus on tariffs and trade restrictions has become clear, with Trump aiming to reduce the U.S. trade deficit and counter what he perceives as unfair Chinese practices.
Trump’s imposition of so-called ‘reciprocal tariffs’ and continued escalation in response to China’s own responses has brought profound difficulties to the bilateral economic relationship. Adding to these challenges, Jamieson Greer, Trump’s new nominee for the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has proposed that Congress revoke China’s “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) status, a move that would fundamentally alter the trade relationship between the two countries. This could lead to the imposition of significantly higher tariffs on Chinese goods, further escalating economic tensions. Such actions signal a broader shift from the current policy of selective de-risking to a more comprehensive strategy aimed at decoupling critical areas of economic engagement. For China, these actions threaten its economic stability and growth trajectory. The Trump administration’s potential moves to strip China of its developing country status in international institutions and restrict access to global markets could further exacerbate tensions.
Security tensions in the Asia-Pacific are also poised to intensify. The Taiwan question will remain the most sensitive flashpoint in China-U.S. relations. Trump’s potential support for Taiwan, including arms sales and high-profile visits by U.S. officials, could push crossStrait relations to a new point of tension.
China views the Taiwan question as a non-negotiable red line, and any perceived shifts in U.S. policy could prompt a strong response, escalating the risk of military confrontation. Moreover, disputes in the South China Sea and U.S. military operations in the region could lead to more frequent and potentially dangerous encounters. The lack of trust and communication channels between the two militaries add to the risks.
Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy and disdain for multilateralism may result in the neglect of formal dialogue mechanisms between U.S. and China. Trump’s initial tariff action with China was to impose an additional 10% tariff, one of the justifications being to force China into cooperation with the U.S. on the fentanyl issue. In fact, fentanyl itself has no direct connection to trade; the linkage is merely a reflection of Trump’s transactional thinking.
In addition, compared to the Biden’s administration, which maintained some level of institutional communication, the Trump administration may prioritise unilateral actions over coordinated efforts to address bilateral or global issues.
This partial breakdown in communication and dialogues could lead to greater misunderstandings and miscalculations.
Steps to Stabilise China-U.S. Relations
While challenges abound, there are several possible steps both sides can take to stabilise relations and prevent further deterioration.
Rebuilding Communication Channels
The first and most urgent step is to institutionalise communication mechanisms at multiple levels, from military-to-military contacts to leaderto-leader dialogues. A summit between the Chinese and the U.S. presidents in the near future would set the tone for managing tensions. Although holding a bilateral summit this year may prove challenging, both sides should seek opportunities for meetings on the side-lines of multilateral events. Even if substantive agreements cannot be reached immediately, such meetings are essential for establishing personal rapport and maintaining crisis management channels. Beyond leadership-level interactions, both sides should continue or re-establish regular high-level dialogues on trade, security and law-enforcement. These platforms can help address specific grievances while fostering a sense of mutual accountability.
Defining “Guardrails” for Competition
Competition should not define the entirety of China-U.S. relations. But a shared understanding of what constitutes acceptable competition is critical to avoiding conflict.
However, the concept of “guardrails” is interpreted differently by the two sides. While the U.S. focuses on mechanisms to manage competition, China emphasises setting “bottom lines” to protect core interests, such as the Taiwan question. To reconcile these perspectives, both sides could work toward a framework that clarifies sensitive areas and outlines protocols for managing disputes. For instance, China could communicate its red lines regarding Taiwan and technology development, while the U.S. might emphasise transparency in military operations and economic policies. China and the U.S. could consider establishing necessary strategic communication channels on major sensitive regional hotspot issues. Both sides should provide each other with a “negative list” on specific topics, clearly outlining their respective areas of interest. Such a framework would not eliminate all competitive elements in the bilateral relations but would provide a structure for managing it responsibly.
Addressing Economic Concerns Pragmatically
On economic issues, both sides should focus on practical measures to mitigate tensions. For example, China could enhance transparency in its economic practices to address U.S. concerns about market access, subsidies, and intellectual property protection. Some measures include establishing dialogues focused on the domestic economic development of the two countries and enhancing Track II dialogues on this theme, both of which could be valuable steps for advancing bilateral cooperation. In return, the U.S. could ease certain tariffs and provide clearer guidelines for Chinese investments in non-sensitive sectors. China and the U.S. should remain openminded about negotiating a new trade agreement or revisiting existing frameworks, as a stable and predictable trade relationship would benefit businesses and consumers in both countries. Both sides should also recognise that excessive U.S. technological restrictions on China may backfire by undermining global supply chains and harming American businesses reliant on international markets. To prevent such negative outcomes, the two countries should define clear boundaries for competition, avoiding a zero-sum mentality in sensitive technological sectors. While deep trust is unlikely, pragmatic cooperation on shared interests could prevent further economic decoupling.
Managing the Taiwan Question with Restraint
Taiwan will remain the most dangerous flashpoint in China-U.S. relations. To avoid escalation, both sides must exercise maximum restraint. The U.S. should avoid actions that Beijing perceives as undermining its sovereignty, such as hosting officials from Chinese Taiwan at high levels or proposing legislation that explicitly challenges the One-China principle (In the U.S. case, this means the One-China policy). In addition, confidencebuilding measures, such as mutual notifications of military activities, could help reduce the risk of accidental confrontations.
Promoting People-to-People Exchanges
An essential yet often overlooked step is fostering deeper people-topeople exchanges. While government-level communications are vital for managing crises, longterm mutual understanding requires stronger ties at the societal level. Initiatives such as expanding student exchanges, cultural programs, academic partnerships, and professional collaboration can help bridge the perception gap between the two countries. Both governments should prioritise facilitating visa processes for students and researchers, supporting joint scientific projects, and encouraging dialogue between think tanks. By investing in peopleto-people exchanges, China and the U.S. can build a more resilient foundation for their relationship, ensuring that societal connections endure even during periods of political discord. For example, the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, where I work, has been hosting the U.S.-China People’s Dialogue in collaboration with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for two consecutive years. This event brings together dozens of representatives from academia, business, society, and culture in both countries to enhance mutual understanding through dialogue. It explores how the peoples of China and the U.S. can deepen cooperation across various fields to support the stable development of bilateral relations.
Leveraging Shared Interests in Global Challenges
Despite significant differences, China and the U.S. share common interests in addressing global challenges such as artificial intelligence, public health, and economic stability. These issues provide opportunities for collaboration that can build goodwill and offset tensions in other areas. For example, both countries could collaborate on pushing forward international standards for AI governance, promoting transparency in AI research, and developing protocols to prevent the risks of AI militarisation. By working together in this cutting-edge field, China and the U.S. could not only build mutual trust but also contribute to global stability in the face of rapid technological change.
The return of Trump to the presidency has introduced a new phase of uncertainty in China-U.S. relations. Economic, security, and diplomatic challenges will test the resilience of the bilateral relationship. However, with pragmatic strategies focused on rebuilding communication, defining boundaries for competition, and leveraging shared interests in emerging challenges like AI, both sides can work toward stabilising their relations.
While a complete resolution of differences may not be feasible in the near term, a framework for managing tensions and avoiding conflict is essential. Ultimately, the future of China-U.S. relations will depend on the willingness of both sides to prioritise stability and coexistence over competition and confrontation.
About the Author
Dr. SUN Chenghao is a fellow and head of U.S.-Europe program at Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University, and a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School in 2024. He is also a member of Munich Young Leaders and with the Munich Security Conference in 2025. His research interests include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, transatlantic relations, AI and International security, etc. He teaches a graduate-level course on Transatlantic Relations in the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University
Dr. Sun has co-authored dozens of reports and books. His latest books Profound Changes Unseen in a Century and the U.S.-Europe Alliance was published by Popular Science Press in 2023, and The Gravity of Power in the White House: The National Security Council (1947-2019) was published by Current Affairs Press in 2020
Response 2 of 2
Prof. Joseph Nye University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government
How can China and the U.S. build trust in a time of rising geopolitical tensions?
Four Phases of American Policies Toward China
After the end of World War II, US-China relations went through three phases that lasted roughly two decades each. Now they are in a fourth phase and it is unclear how long it will last. Hostility marked the 20 years after the Korean War, followed by limited cooperation against the Soviet Union during the phase that followed President Richard Nixon’s famous 1972 visit. The end of the Cold War ushered in a third phase of economic engagement, with the US helping China’s global economic integration, including its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001.
Since 2017, however, the US National Security Strategy focuses on great power rivalry, with China and Russia designated as America’s main adversaries, and China identified the “pacing challenge.” While many Chinese analysts blame this fourth phase on President Donald Trump, Xi Jinping is equally to blame. By rejecting Deng Xiaoping’s prudent policy of maintaining a low international profile; by ending presidential term limits; and by proclaiming his nationalistic “China Dream”, Xi might as well have been wearing a red hat reading, “Make China Great Again”.
The conventional wisdom on China within the US had already begun to sour before the 2016 presidential election. Trump’s rhetoric and tariffs were merely gasoline poured on an already smouldering fire.
The liberal international order helped China sustain rapid economic growth and reduce poverty dramatically. But China also tilted the trade field to its advantage by subsidizing state-owned enterprises, engaging in commercial espionage, and requiring foreign firms to transfer their intellectual property to domestic “partners”. While some analysts argued that Trump was mistaken to focus on the bilateral trade deficit and tariffs, many supported his complaints about China’s efforts to challenge America’s technological advantage.
Some expected this fourth phase to be brief and to change back to engagement with the election of Joe Biden in 2020, but in fact Biden followed the broad outlines of Trump’s approach of great power competition. To some extent this reflected the views of American politicians and officials, but it also reflected the policies of Xi Jinping who clamped down on independent views and market forces and relied on increasingly tight communist party controls. While this fourth phase of the relationship is not a new cold war, because of the higher degree of USChina economic and ecological interdependence than was true of US-Soviet relations, it is much more than a mere economic rivalry and remains susceptible to disruption by unpredictable events in the South China Sea and Taiwan. A crisis that involved force would quickly usher in a fifth (and unwanted) phase. With the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the fourth phase is likely to continue, but Trump prides himself on his unpredictability, and we should set our expectations accordingly.
About the Author
Joseph S. Nye is a University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor’s degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. His most recent books include: A Life in the American Century; The Power to Lead; The Future of Power; Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era; and Is the American Century Over. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the American Academy of Diplomacy. In a recent survey of international relations scholars, he was ranked as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy, and in 2011, Foreign Policy named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers.
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