Themes: diplomatic history between the Indo-Pacific and China; trade relations in the Indo-Pacific; Chinese and Indo-Pacific development projects; possible future outlooks for relations between China and the Indo-Pacific.
Concise commentary on complex issues from different points of view.
The UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme offers contrasting ‘short, sharp reads’ for those seeking a fuller exploration of key questions. This issue explores:
“How does the Indo-Pacific view China and vice-versa?”
Authors, alphabetically by surname:
- Manoj Kewalramani, Chairperson of Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila
- Selina Ho, Associate Professor at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
How does the Indo-Pacific view China?
Manoj Kewalramani Chairperson of Indo-Pacific Studies Programme Takshashila Institution
February 2025
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Response 1 of 2
In international relations, what you see, and how you view an actor or situation, often depends on where you sit. Geography constitutes a key part of this positioning. It is, of course, the immutable component of geopolitics—as permanent as anything can be. Another key aspect is the relationships that states share with each other. Understandings of power and interests along with one’s experiences and interactions tend to shape these. In a globalised world, what also matters is the broader pattern of global distribution of power. The role of this third factor in shaping perceptions and relationships is particularly accentuated in moments of major power shifts. Therefore, in order to understand how states in the Indo-Pacific view China, one must take into account each of these three factors. The IndoPacific region stretches from the western shores of the United States to western Africa. The emergence of this region as a continuous strategic space is underpinned by the shifting gravity of global economic power from the geopolitical West towards the East. The Indo-Pacific is home to 65% of the world’s population and accounts for over 60% of global GDP and nearly half of the world’s merchandise trade
As a strategic waterway, the Indian Ocean connects the natural resourcesrich regions of Africa and West Asia to the labour, capital, and consumer markets across the Indian subcontinent and East Asia. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Indo-Pacific is a hub for key supply chains—from automobiles, electronics, electrical machinery, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals to telecommunications equipment.
As the world’s biggest manufacturer, a major consumer market and a power with rapidly expanding military capacity, China is a critical actor in the region. It is also evidently seeking to establish its status as the pre-eminent power in the Indo-Pacific. This presents a peculiar dichotomy for regional actors. On one hand, cooperation is essential for mutual prosperity. For most countries in the region, strong economic ties with China are critical for their development. On the other hand, China’s rapid material power expansion coupled with its assertive foreign policy posture, particularly the use of force in territorial disputes or economic coercion, are provoking friction and counter-balancing behaviour. This is evident in the deepening military ties between the US and countries like India, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea. It can also be seen in steps taken by regional actors to engage in economic de-risking vis-a-vis China. All this is taking place within the backdrop of deepening Sino-US strategic competition. Consequently, the China-US dynamic and their respective domestic policy swings are increasingly impinging on regional states’ room for manoeuvre and ability to balance development and security objectives.
Examining trade, military cooperation and survey data from different sub-regions of the broader Indo-Pacific offers insights into the evolving perspectives on China. In East Asia, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) today view China as the most critical strategic actor.
In 2024, the ASEAN region remained China’s largest trading partner with total trade estimated at $982 billion. Although Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the US still eclipses Chinese FDI in ASEAN countries, FDI flows from China have seen rapid growth since 2020. Trade with Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) countries, meanwhile, constitutes nearly one-third of China’s overall foreign trade. Deep economic interlinkages with China coupled with concerns around continuity and securitisation of US policy have led to more favourable views of China. In a remarkable turnaround, the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report, published by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, had China (50.5%) inching ahead of the US (49.5%) as the partner of choice in a bilateral contest. What’s also added to this is China’s fastexpanding military capacity, along with a demonstrated willingness to use force as a tool of coercion. This has achieved mixed results for China. Perceiving a heightened sense of threat, countries like South Korea and the Philippines have adopted sharp counterbalancing actions. Others like Indonesia and Cambodia have sought to appease and arrive at an accommodation with Beijing.
Across the Middle East too, deep economic ties coupled with increasing political engagement and angst with US policy has shaped favourable views of China.
China’s trade with Arab countries has grown substantially over the decades, reaching $444.2 billion in 2023. Beijing has invested billions of dollars in Gulf economies in the form of construction projects, infrastructure investments, and joint technology projects, while itself seeking capital from Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds. Several Arab countries have signed on to Chinese global initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, and share common perspectives on normative issues such as human rights and democracy. Such alignment has coincided with deeper Chinese political involvement in the region. This is evident in Beijing’s efforts to negotiate a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as it is in its vocal support for Palestinian cause. That said, China’s ability to project power, particularly military power, to shape favourable outcomes in this region remains severely constrained. It is evident that countries in the region recognise this, and have consequently used engagement by and with Beijing as a useful hedge to bargain with Washington. This pattern is likely to sustain for the foreseeable future.
This, however, is increasingly not the case in the Indian subcontinent. In this sub-region of the IndoPacific, China is increasingly playing not just an economic but a more significant political and security role. China is the leading trade partner for most countries in the region. It is also one of the largest overseas financiers, having funded connectivity, energy and infrastructure projects. Countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Maldives have endorsed key Chinese global initiatives and are working with Beijing in areas like poverty alleviation and development.
More importantly, there are growing signs of Chinese interference and influence in the domestic politics of these countries. This has been evident in the political shifts in governments in the Maldives over the past decade, recent Chinese outreach to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islamic in Bangladesh, in the public activism of Chinese diplomats and Communist Party officials in Nepal and the corruption of the Rajapaksa regime which China supported in Sri Lanka. In addition, China’s military footprint is expanding in the region through exports, particularly to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and increased presence in the Indian Ocean Region. For most regional actors, the primary challenge remains balancing the gains from economic cooperation with China while limiting its corrosive political influence.
In addition, they must mitigate the threat of being caught in the crossfire of Sino-Indian and SinoAmerican contestation. This is likely to be a challenging proposition. India remains the dominant regional power, but its relationship with China is increasingly growing competitive. Both India and China appear to view each other from the threat rather than opportunity prism. This dynamic is a product of structural factors, and is unlikely to be wished away any time soon.
In sum, the answer to the question of how Indo-Pacific states view China is complex. China is an economic partner, but those economic connections do not come without strings attached and often lead to political instability. It is an expanding power, seeking a greater security presence and acquiescence to its core interests.
Yet, this effort is increasingly disruptive, particularly as China competes with the US and regional major powers like India. In the end, Indo-Pacific states recognise that China is an economic opportunity, a security and political challenge and a geographic reality—one that must be engaged, managed, and ultimately co-existed with.
About the Author
Manoj Kewalramani is Fellow in China Studies and the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution. He is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.), served as a Visiting Senior Fellow (Nov 2023 – Feb 2024) at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore), and is also an alumnus of the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) as part of the Enhancing Regional Maritime Governance and Cooperation in the Quad chapter of the year 2022.
His research interests range from Chinese politics, foreign policy and approaches to new technologies to addressing questions of how India can work with like-minded partners to deal with the challenges presented by China’s rise.
Manoj is the author of Smokeless War: China’s Quest for Geopolitical Dominance, which discusses China’s political, diplomatic, economic and narrative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.
About the UKNCC
We help leaders make better decisions on China by providing Educational Programmes & Pathfinder Dialogues.
In an era witnessing a rise of misinformation, polarising politics and divisive media, the decisionmaking context on matters related to China is extremely complex.
Since the end of the ‘Golden Era‘, the discourse on China in the U.K. has become dominated by hawks, apologists, and special interest groups pursuing narrow agendas.
Recognising that there was a market failure in the U.K. in fostering a national China-facing capability, the UKNCC was established in 2020.
Today, UKNCC is Britain’s leading independent educational non-profit on China. As a community interest company (CIC), UKNCC is also Britain’s only China-focused organisation that is prohibited from lobbying under U.K. law.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
How does the Indo-Pacific view China?
Dr. Selina Ho Associate Professor Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy National University of Singapore
November 2024
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Response 2 of 2
Southeast Asia’s View of China
Unlike countries in the West, most Southeast Asian countries do not view China as a threat. Although there are concerns about the aggressive turn in Chinese foreign policy, most see China as an economic opportunity. They have enthusiastically embraced China’s rise as a boon to the region, with the potential to lift millions out of poverty. China is the Association of Southeast Nations’ (ASEAN) largest trading partner since 2009 and since 2020, ASEAN has replaced the European Union as China’s largest trading partner. Southeast Asian states also see strategic value in supporting China’s rise instead of resisting or fearing it. An active China allows Southeast Asian states to pursue strategic diversification, such that they do not become overly reliant on the United States (US). China also provides a strategic rationale for the United States to remain in the region, assuaging regional concerns of US abandonment. These attitudes towards China do not mean that the region accepts Chinese dominance unequivocally. There are worries about Chinese power and influence. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian countries regard China as a reality that they have to manage and live with. The region accepts China’s dominant position but eschews an exclusive relationship with it. It exercises agency by enmeshing China in a set of relationships, socialising it with ASEAN norms, and modifying its behaviour through bargaining strategies, issuelinkages, and appealing to normative principles.
Economic Opportunity
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has brought Chinese aid and investment to the cities and remote regions of Southeast Asian countries. Special Economic Zones run by Chinese entities in Laos, for instance, promise to lift entire provinces out of poverty. Even during the pandemic, Chinese infrastructure projects have more or less continued apace. In Laos, the ChinaLaos high-speed railway (it is more accurately a medium-speed railway, running at the top speed of 160 kilometres per hour) was completed on time and became operational in December 2021. Today, it is the pride of the Lao nation, connecting regions and generating employment and training opportunities for the Lao people. Southeast Asia’s digital trade and ecommerce with Chinese entities have also grown, with Alibaba being particularly active in the region. Chinese technology companies such as Huawei, ZTE, Bytedance, and Tencent, have a large presence in the region.
The BRI and Chinese infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia in general give China tremendous opportunities to wield power in the region. The form that power takes in this context is not just material, that is, economic and military. Infrastructure power also allows China to structure social relations between itself and the smaller states as well as among the smaller states. China’s preponderance of power and asymmetrical relations with these nations facilitate Chinese dominance in the region.
In varying degrees, Southeast Asian states are economically dependent on China to drive growth in their countries. Such dependency results in smaller states, consciously or unconsciously, aligning their domestic policies and foreign policy decisions to take into account Chinese interests.
By dominating infrastructure in the region through the BRI, China is also shaping ideas and discourse. It is able to establish narratives such as “win-win” and “to get rich, first build roads.” Thus far, seven Southeast Asian countries have signed on to its “community of shared future.”
These narratives – when countries buy into them – increase Chinese influence, shunting aside alternative narratives of risks to sovereignty, debt, and negative environmental impact. Chinese narratives of progress, growth and modernity resonate with the region, such that the tendency is for regional countries to ignore other narratives that Chinese infrastructure projects could imperil their own national interests.
Suspicions and Distrust
However, there is no singular view of China among Southeast Asians. How Southeast Asian countries respond to China is determined by their own domestic politics. Southeast Asian elites that rely on economic growth as their legitimating narrative, such as Cambodia and Lao, for instance, tend to draw closer to China. Regime security concerns are another factor that shapes responses; the crisis of legitimacy that the Thai military junta has faced since the coup in 2014 have caused them to accommodate China in the security realm despite being a US ally. Likewise, the internationally isolated Myanmar junta has no alternative but to turn to China.
Conversely, those that have historical and territorial disputes with China, such as the Philippines, tend to lean closer to the United States to enhance their security. Countries that espouse an independent foreign policy such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore try to balance their relations with China by seeking a diversity of partners.
Despite differences in how the region responds to China, there is however a shared suspicion and distrust of China although the strength of such sentiments varies across countries.
China lacks social capital in the region, a key ingredient for establishing hegemonic rule. Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics are viewed as unpredictable and uncertain, which makes it difficult for other countries to trust China to lead the region. A recent survey on elite perceptions conducted in six Southeast Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, revealed that most elites in these countries do not accept a China-led regional order. Whilst they view China as highly influential and identify with it culturally, they nonetheless regard ASEAN as the highest-ranking body in the region and overwhelmingly identify most with ASEAN, lending credence to the view that a collective ASEAN identity exists.
These perceptions are also borne out by the behaviour of Southeast Asian states. Southeast Asians welcome all major powers in the region. There is preference for diversity in the region, as it guarantees that no single power can dominate. Southeast Asian countries also continue to pursue regionalism and multilateralism centred on ASEAN; their narrative is that of a world transiting to a multipolar world order in which ASEAN is one pole. Taken together, regional perceptions and behaviour suggest that Southeast Asians do not perceive China as having the legitimate right to lead the region.
What explains this ambivalence towards China despite the economic goodies China brings to the region? China’s unpredictable and aggressive foreign policy behaviour is a leading cause of Southeast Asians’ distrust. China is perceived as not having sufficiently and credibly committed itself to the self-restraints which are necessary to build and sustain authority in Southeast Asia.
The region is worried about “wolf warrior diplomacy,” belligerence in the South China Sea, the use of coercion and punishment, and interference in the domestic affairs of regional states. Additionally, anti-Chinese sentiments are latent in the region, springing up sporadically and violently during periods of economic and political upheavals, such as the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the post-election riots in Indonesia in 2019. The persistence of anti-Chinese sentiments suggests that Chinese civilisational and cultural hegemony lacks legitimacy.
Outlook
Trends in the region suggest that despite Southeast Asia’s reservations about China, the region will likely move even closer to China in the future. The lack of viable economic alternatives is one factor, but generational change and increasing societal and political fragmentation are also factors that could lead to the growth of Chinese influence. Although Japan, South Korea and the European Union are economically active in the region, they are unable to compete with China, for instance, in meeting the region’s deep infrastructure needs.
Moreover, younger Southeast Asians have grown up at a time when China is prosperous and powerful. Despite China’s current economic woes, the West’s economic problems and political polarisation are worse by comparison. There is indeed admiration for a China model that seems to be able to get things done. Because of increasing societal and political fragmentation in Southeast Asian countries, China has shown that it is able to penetrate these domestic cleavages and ultimately work with different actors and stakeholders to gain leverage and influence in these countries.
About the Author
Selina Ho is Associate Professor in International Affairs and Co-Director of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. She researches Chinese politics and foreign policy, with a focus on how China wields power and influence via infrastructure and water disputes in Southeast Asia and South Asia.
Selina is the author of Thirsty Cities: Social Contracts and Public Goods Provision in China and India and coauthor of Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia. Her articles are published in top international relations and area studies journals.
About the UKNCC
We help leaders make better decisions on China by providing Educational Programmes & Pathfinder Dialogues.
In an era witnessing a rise of misinformation, polarising politics and divisive media, the decisionmaking context on matters related to China is extremely complex.
Since the end of the ‘Golden Era‘ , the discourse on China in the U.K. has become dominated by hawks, apologists, and special interest groups pursuing narrow agendas.
Recognising that there was a market failure in the U.K. in fostering a national China-facing capability, the UKNCC was established in 2020.
Today, UKNCC is Britain’s leading independent educational non-profit on China. As a community interest company (CIC), UKNCC is also Britain’s only China-focused organisation that is prohibited from lobbying under U.K. law.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
Company Directors:
Frank Slevin (Chairman)
Ollie Shiell (CEO)
Andrew Cainey
Dr. Winnie King
Advisory Board:
Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC (Chairman)
Angelica Anton
Sir Victor Blank
Sir Andrew Cahn KCMG
Ellie Chadwick
Rahul Sinha
Sir Tim Smit KBE
Benjamin Speyer
Kui Man Gerry Yeung OBE
Contact us at:
