Themes: the security laws’ impact on UK-China relations; what the laws mean for Hong Kong’s population; how the security laws will impact Hong Kong and the rest of the world in the future.
Concise commentary on complex issues from different points of view.
The UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme offers contrasting ‘short, sharp reads’ for those seeking a fuller exploration of key questions. This May 2021 edition explores the question:
“What is happening in Hong Kong on security laws and should the UK be concerned?”
Authors, alphabetically by surname:
- Evan Fowler, Associate Fellow, Henry Jackson Society
- Christine Loh, Chief Development Strategist Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology’s Institute for the Environment - Dr Tim Summers, Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
“What is happening in Hong Kong on security laws and should the UK be concerned?”
Author: Evan Fowler Associate Fellow, Henry Jackson Society
May 2021
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Hong Kong is a changed city. It also continues to be a rapidly changing city. All forms of UK engagement with Hong Kong, whether business or otherwise, must account not only for the new reality, but understand the direction of travel. This does not mean there should be less engagement, but it does mean a different type of engagement is needed that is significantly more informed, cautious and strategic. These are the key points to know:
1. Sino-British Joint Declaration is in breach
The UK government (correctly) considers the Sino-British Joint Declaration to be in a state of serious and permanent breach. It is worth noting that this is a very disadvantageous conclusion for the UK government to draw, as it threatens UK commercial interests not only in the city but also in Asia given the city’s role as a hub for UK interests at a time when the country is looking to develop deeper ties with the region.
Declaring the Joint Declaration to be in breach also undermines the UK’s special relationship with Hong Kong, and its right to comment on and seek to influence the situation.
For China, the treaty is considered a “historic document” of no continuing relevance. Though this position predates Xi Jinping’s presidency, this understanding has become more central to Beijing’s narrative on Hong Kong. Conveniently it ensures a more ideological, assertive and controlling regime is not only not bound by any ongoing commitments, but allows legitimate UK and international interests in Hong Kong to be more easily framed as “interference”.
For Hong Kong, it is worth remembering that the Joint Declaration forms the basis of everything that makes Hong Kong different from China. The agreement forms the basis of the city’s constitution, the Basic Law — the only post-colonial constitutional settlement which excluded the people from having any say. The limits of the concept of One Country, Two Systems are most clearly illustrated if we consider Chinese rule in Tibet, where the concept was first applied.
2. The chilling effect of the National Security Law
The law was drafted and imposed by Beijing, and should be read and understood not within the context of Hong Kong law but Chinese law. It is broad, sweeping, draconian and extraterritorial in application; authorises Chinese law enforcement authorities to operate in Hong Kong; and provides a route for arrested persons to be tried and sentenced on the Mainland.
What is deemed to constitute a threat to national security, and how national security is understood and defined, is determined politically and in Beijing. Hong Kong lawyers are neither qualified nor able to provide professional advice in this area.
This is the greatest constitutional watershed in recent history. Jimmy Lai’s bail appeal was denied because the courts stated that the National Security Law overrides constitutional human rights safeguards. None of the human rights safeguards which apply in Hong Kong’s Basic Law are applicable to the legislation.
In content and in the way the law was passed it is a serious breach of the Joint Declaration. In its application, the evidence since June 2020 makes clear it is not meant simply to empower, but to allow for the aggressive persecution of opposition voices. Far from being narrowly defined, it is being used to justify a raft of legislation and actions to curtail freedom of expression, reform education and threaten the press.
To present these actions as reasonable given the 2019 protests does not hold up to scrutiny — those targeted, who include respected legislators, lawyers, labour rights activists, have for the most part been the voices of moderation. What is criminalised is not inciting violence but to represent a challenge to Beijing’s narrative. However the most ominous effect has been the silencing of a people who, as in China, do not know where Beijing sets the lines. The consequences of crossing these lines is now not only far greater, but also less certain.
3. The drivers of dissent remain
Whilst economic and social issues may have shaped the nature of the protests, the protests were driven by issues of politics and identity. These issues not only remain but have intensified. It is worth remembering that the demands of the protests were political, and were principally about accountability.
The protests were also a long time in coming.
The failure of traditional, moderate pandemocrats to engage with Beijing, when they were not asking for anything more than for Beijing to honour its word, in spirit as well as by the letter of the law, had already changed the nature of politics in Hong Kong.
What is new, and has grown since the failure of the 2014 protests to effect political reform, has been the growth in a more radical, localist and identitybased politics, the seeds of which go back a decade and to Beijing’s attempts to shape the Hong Kong Chinese identity. It is often overlooked that Hong Kong is a city where the local and indigenous language, Cantonese, which is spoken by 99% of the population, has been relegated from an official language to a dialect; and where “mother-tongue” learning is conducted in a non-language, Putonghua, with connotations of a regime from which a significant number of Hong Kong families once fled.
As shown in 2008, when Hong Kong people were only too happy to embrace a national and Chinese identity, it is not China nor being Chinese that is the issue, but being told what they must think and understand to be China and how to be Chinese. The trouble for Hong Kong and Beijing is that it is impossible to acknowledge these issues without undermining the national narrative.
The response has been to do what Beijing has always done when faced with internal dissent: to acknowledge socio-economic issues, whilst placing agency in the conspiratorial “black hands” of foreign powers. Stability is restored not through engagement and compromise, but through division, demonisation and then the destruction of dissent. This Chinese style harmonisation is fundamentally different to the ideals of governance as an act of balancing competing interests on which Hong Kong had been built.
4. Looking ahead
Understanding the local political situation in Hong Kong has never been more important. Politics and political ideology, not pragmatism, is driving change in the city. This will continue, in line with Beijing, as Hong Kong is integrated into Xi Jinping’s new China. This does not mean Hong Kong will not be different. It remains in China’s interests to ensure the pretence of Two Systems continues, if only to placate loyal Hong Kong and domestic opinion; and to ensure that Hong Kong remains a conduit for China to engage with the West, both as place to attract inwards investment and also, and increasingly, from where Chinese influence can extend outwards.
Rather Hong Kong will continue to offer relative advantages to the rest of China in the areas that count — in civil and individual freedoms, rule of law, access to information, press freedoms. But the point to note is that they will be relative, and not absolute as they once were.
Thus, we are seeing the birth of a hybrid system that provides the surety that businesses require to operate, provided they operate within changing parameters set by Beijing – parameters which even Wen Jiabao and Jack Ma, among others, find difficult to read. As we see in China, this does not mean politics is to be avoided — to the contrary, businesses and all forms of engagement must be prepared to be political pawns when called upon.
n Xi’s China, all is subordinate to the party. The trouble for Hong Kong is that having rule of law or press freedom only most of the time is not to truly have either. However, Beijing and the Hong Kong authorities are banking that it will be enough.
It has never been more important for UK officials and businesses to know what is happening politically and on the ground. It has also never been more difficult, with the community never more divided both socioeconomically and by design. It would not be inaccurate to describe Beijing and the West fighting an information war, with two competing realities presented.
Whilst reading beyond these is critical, we must not fall to seeing in both a false equivalence: lacking nuance in honest reporting is not the same as a fabricated narrative.
There is an urgent need to change the way we understand Hong Kong and China, and the way we assess the risk of operating there. Past presumptions, including of the soundness of the city’s governance and core institutions, in particular in regard to information and the rule of law, must be set aside. UK businesses (and officials) have been better at focusing on Beijing than they have at reading and being sensitive to the local political and social situation.
This must change. We can no longer afford to see Hong Kong and China not as it is but as we wish it to be. The risks to our businesses, to our values and to our national interests are too high to be complacent. There needs to be greater appreciation of what we do not know.
Investments need to be made to ensure in all forms of engagement we are better able to understand developments in Hong Kong and China, and to understand that they are now more complex than they were. China, and the geopolitical situation, is unlikely to change.
About the Author
Born and raised in Hong Kong to a Eurasian family, Evan has deep roots within the city. He is a writer, essayist and commentator on a broad range of topics, from art, culture and philosophy, to social and political commentaries. He has a particular interests in the history, culture and identity of his home.
He is co-founder of Hong Kong Free Press and an Associate Fellow in Henry Jackson Society. A pioneer of sustainability messaging in the AsiaPacific, prior to his relocation to the UK he had previously held multiple directorships in both the private and NGO sector, and between 2007 – 2015 ran the Hong Kong Identity Project. He was also the China representative for the Kennedy Center for Human Rights. Evan’s areas of interest are contemporary Chinese identity and social-politics; Asian nationalism and national narratives; and East-West engagement. Given his roots he is particular drawn towards UK-Chinese relations. As an essayist and commentator, his work has been translated and published in 5 languages.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
“What is happening in Hong Kong on security laws and should the UK be concerned?”
Christine Loh Chief Development Strategist Hong Kong University of Science and Technology’s Institute for the Environment
May 2021
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
There is no doubt that the UK and Hong Kong have a special relationship. After all, the British presence in Hong Kong started in 1842 and only ended in 1997. Diplomacy and the ensuing Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 settled the return of Hong Kong as a British colony to become China’s special administrative region.
At the time of transition, both the UK and China had an interest in Hong Kong’s continuing success. For the UK, Hong Kong was an example of long years of wise colonial administration – which bolstered British prestige in the world; and British business wanted stability to continue their many profitable enterprises and activities. Furthermore, it also gave the UK good reasons for strengthening its engagement with China, a growing market and regional power. The UK also had so many other connections with Hong Kong people, such as through universities, schools, professional bodies, and cultural institutions. Significantly, Hong Kong used English common law as the foundation of its legal system.
For China, Hong Kong’s economic success was an interesting case study for its own experiment with modernisation and opening-up to the outside world. It was prepared to accept that not only were there all kinds of British interests invested in its previous colony, but that the UK’s closest allies also had many interests in Hong Kong, especially America, Canada and Australia.
Through the years of political instability in China, the people of Hong Kong – many of whom were once refugees escaping chaos and poverty on the mainland – saw these English-speaking countries as superior in their organisation with strong economic opportunities. Hong Kong people built many commercial and social relations with their western counterparts. For China, Hong Kong was seen as an invaluable and colourful addition to the socialist mainland.
Hong Kong offered the UK and its closest allies a foothold to conduct all kinds of activities even after 1997, much like they did during the colonial era. Hong Kong was a bit of the “west” in the “east”, a capitalist enclave at the doorstep of imperial China that morphed into the socialist People’s Republic. A place of convenience where commercial business could be done and intelligence traded across very different cultures through good and bad times of imperial disintegration, world wars, regional wars, revolutions, civil war, as well as Asia’s peace time economic rise.
Hong Kong was a special positive topic for the UK, US and other western powers to engage with Beijing.
America’s US-Hong Kong Policy Act 1992 allowed it to continue to treat the special administrative region separately from socialist mainland China for trade export and economic control after 1997, which was seen at the time as supportive of Hong Kong’s ‘high degree of autonomy’ to function on a day-today basis without interference from Beijing except in diplomatic and military matters. It also served US interests.
Whatever concerns Beijing had about the massive foreign presence in Hong Kong, it was prepared to set them aside in a pragmatic manner. Hong Kong continued to be a useful place for the west in the east albeit, with a new sovereign. But things have changed dramatically in the past three years and the UK is fast losing Hong Kong as a small but useful nexus with Beijing and may never regain it to Britain’s own detriment. It may be that the British political elites no longer value Hong Kong as they once did to serve any real function vis-à-vis China.
The following factors are worth reflecting upon:
Firstly, the US is the leader of the pack in developing a negative China policy that involves attacking its governing system, ruling party, and leader. China is portrayed as a competitor with the wrong ideology, and it is to be distrusted. America is bringing together “a new grouping of likeminded nations, a new alliance of democracies” to induce change in China, in the words of Mike Pompeo, the previous secretary of state, in July 2020. President Biden sees the fight as between “autocracy and democracy”. Does the UK want to buy into that kind of logic and rhetoric?
Secondly, Hong Kong has become one of the boxing arenas of the big power conflict between the US and China, along with Taiwan and Xinjiang. China is no longer a regional but global power. This conflict is expected to be long-lasting and the UK is seen to be a follower of US policy. If the US were to back off, what would the UK do? In sticking with the US-led pack for now, the UK needs to reflect on what is in its own best interest and what is in the interest of the people of Hong Kong (assuming this is a consideration).
Thirdly, while there is a view among activists that foreign pressure would change Beijing, it has not backed off from securing Hong Kong’s politics against what it sees as foreign interference because its heightened national security concerns trumps bending to foreign pressure that wants regime change and/or to constrain China’s development. If there is an opportunity to ease geopolitical tensions, Beijing could well be pragmatic – which requires the UK to consider how far it is willing to go to make calls, such as that China has violated the Sino-British Joint Declaration when the national people’s congress passed the National Security Law (NSL) for Hong Kong in 2020. The allegation remains debatable in law and process.
It is one thing to dislike what is happening in Hong Kong but another to allege a breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, or to pressurise British judges to stop serving on Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, neither of which serves the interests of the UK nor Hong Kong.
Fourthly, the US has normalised the weaponization of the use of government sanctions against its adversaries. It has imposed sanctions on Chinese officials as well as Hong Kong officials over the passage of the NSL China retaliated and imposed sanctions. The UK has not imposed sanctions relating to Hong Kong, but it has on Chinese officials over Xinjiang.
China retaliated by sanctioning certain British institutions and individuals and their immediate family members from entering the whole of China. Their assets in China are frozen, and Chinese institutions and citizens are prohibited from dealing with them. The tit-for-tat sanctions generate mutual animosity, but there is probably pressure on the UK to dial-up the heat and follow the US in applying Hong Kong-related sanctions.
It seems that the UK has lost Hong Kong as that special topic on which it can exchange views positively with Beijing. So far, Hong Kong too has not gained from the growing big power conflict. If anything, Hong Kong stands precariously at a juncture in geopolitics that has turned unfavourable for the special administrative region and its people.
About the Author
Christine Loh is chief development strategist at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology’s Institute for the Environment.
She is also visiting professor at the Anderson School of Management, UCLA. Professor Loh was a legislator (1992-97, 1998-2000) and ministerial appointee in Hong Kong government (2012-17).
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
“What is happening in Hong Kong on security laws and should the UK be concerned?”
: Dr. Tim Summers Associate Fellow, Chatham House
May 2021
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Hong Kong is clearly going through a period of transition. In the UK it has become commonplace to talk about this as a “crackdown” or even to suggest we are (finally) witnessing the long-prophesied end of Hong Kong. This narrative often starts with the National Security Law enacted on 30 June 2020, and proceeds to the reforms to Hong Kong’s electoral system currently underway. These are indeed significant events, which will shape Hong Kong politics in new ways. But they did not come from nowhere. Instead, both measures can be seen as responses to the way Hong Kong politics and governance have been developing over a number of years. Alternative analyses and explanations needs to be discussed and taken seriously in the UK.
In short, Hong Kong politics has for a number of years become more polarised and divisive, and the city’s governance increasingly ineffective. These trends were on display in 2014, when the community was deeply divided over democratic reforms, leading to the 79-day, largely peaceful Occupy movement followed by a rejection of the significant though gradual change on offer
In the aftermath of Occupy, politics moved in more radical directions, with calls for independence and a brief episode of rioting in early 2016. After a new Legislative Council was elected in autumn 2016, filibustering and fisticuffs were more common than rational debate.
But an even bigger shock came in mid 2019, with mass demonstrations over a proposed extradition bill descending into increasingly frequent and intense violence.
By the end of the year, the sense of crisis had magnified. The Hong Kong government seemed incapable of dealing with events. Street activism eventually declined in early 2020, due partly to Covid-19, but also to more proactive and restrictive policing. The response of the central authorities in Beijing throughout much of this period was less assertive than many expected.
After a regular gathering of the party elite in October 2019, a strategy of greater engagement with Hong Kong politics began to emerge. This was seen in personnel and institutional changes in the management of Hong Kong affairs, in more frequent and strident public interventions, and – most notably – in the decision to pass national security legislation for Hong Kong.
While the original intention had been for Hong Kong’s legislature to legislate on national security, the stalemate in Hong Kong’s governance had clearly made this impossible. Instead, Beijing made use of a provision in the Basic Law (that sets out the “one country, two systems” framework) which allows legislation on issues of national concern to be added to Annex III of the Basic Law and then promulgated locally (something on which the SinoBritish Joint Declaration is silent). This little-used measure was controversial, but legitimate, and – in Beijing’s eyes – a necessary response to the crisis into which Hong Kong had been plunged.
The crisis was not just about the need to return to public order in Hong Kong, but to deal with calls for independence and the growing support for the protest movement from outside Hong Kong. In 2019, this was particularly evident in interventions by US politicians, in the context of an intensifying anti-China policy by the Trump administration. But it was also a feature of the UK’s politics and policy when it came to Hong Kong. The idea behind the National Security Law was to ensure that Hong Kong could not become a base for subversion, a long-standing concern of policy elites in Beijing. Its implementation has proved controversial, with the arrests of close to 100 individuals, including many former legislators.
These cases will take time (maybe years) to work their way through the courts, a process which will establish the scope and practical impact of this new legislation.
Further controversy came in March 2021 with the announcement of changes to the system for selecting the Chief Executive and legislature. The latter will be expanded from 70 to 90, but with the number of directly-elected seats reduced from 30 to 20. That does not mean the end of dissent or debate, though, as a quick glance at the daily business of the current establishment-dominated Council shows. Other major changes are the introduction of a centralised committee to screen potential candidates and an expanded remit for the Election Committee, which will again choose legislators.
The impact of these changes will only become clear over time, after the rescheduled legislative elections are held in December 2021 and the next Chief Executive chosen in spring 2022. Over this period, I suggest that four areas are worth watching closely.
First, what does this mean for the constitutional framework of “one country, two systems”?
Hong Kong politics will not be the same as it was before 2019, and from Beijing’s perspective these changes offer a chance to mend some of the previous dysfunction. But Hong Kong will remain distinctive within China, with a different governance framework and institutions from other cities, including through direct elections for some legislative seats. And Hong Kong’s economic and financial system, supported by strong institutions and a mature legal and judicial system, will continue to support it playing a role as a leading international financial and business centre.
Second is the question of governance. Key to evaluating the recent changes will be whether they facilitate improved governance. Hong Kong faces plenty of well-documented challenges, such as economic recovery from Covid-19 to longer-term issues around affordable housing, the environment and poverty. Less politics about the political system itself may create more space for these issues to be addressed and for the government to enhance its governing capacity. This will not be easy, but it is what Hong Kong needs.
Third, Hong Kong can still perform financial and business functions not possible elsewhere in China, and retain its position as a point of open connectivity between the global and Chinese economies. At a more local level, it is also a developed and wellconnected city in the GuangdongHong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, a region of 70 million people with the most open and dynamic economy in China. Hong Kong has much to offer in sectors such as education and healthcare, while dynamic neighbours like Shenzhen are outperforming in technology and manufacturing.
Finally, international reactions. There are plenty of challenges in Hong Kong, and clear unease among much (though not all) of the population about how the city might emerge from its current period of transition. This unease, amplified by many of Beijing’s critics overseas, has captured the imagination of policy makers in the UK and other major Western capitals. Some in Hong Kong are looking to leave, and the UK is preparing to welcome them. It is clear that international confidence in Hong Kong’s future is much reduced. This is partly about Hong Kong, but it also reflects the wider context.
Relations between China and the West have moved from “tensions” to hostility and strategic rivalry. Developments in Hong Kong have played into that, and been used to reinforce negative perceptions about China in Western capitals. These dynamics look likely to continue for years to come, while the US’s Strategic Competition Act suggests its support for Hong Kong’s opposition movement will continue.
For Hong Kong, this creates a significant challenge. It no longer occupies a sweet spot between China and the US in the context of a globalising economy.
The UK’s approach to Hong Kong has shifted from looking to use Hong Kong to further its global objectives and engagement with China to one of strong opposition to Beijing’s approach. It has called three breaches of the 1984 SinoBritish Joint Declaration. However, the argument that Beijing is breaching the Joint Declaration by reshaping Hong Kong’s political system ignores Beijing’s historical role in designing that system and setting it out in the Basic Law. Sovereignty now lies with China and London does not have the unilateral right to interpret the handover settlement, but its statements do indicate its distance from Beijing on Hong Kong issues.
While the UK government is no doubt genuinely troubled by political trends in Hong Kong, it is also under political pressure from Westminster to voice those concerns robustly. That is linked to wider perceptions of and policy towards China. Unless the politics around China shift, we can expect the UK to continue to amplify opposition concerns and to adopt a highly critical approach towards developments in Hong Kong. This may not serve the UK’s wider economic, financial and cultural interests, but it is the political reality in which London’s approach to Hong Kong is going to be shaped for some time to come.
About the Author
Dr Tim Summers is a (non-resident) associate fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme at Chatham House and an assistant Professor at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK).
Tim is the author of three books, China’s Hong Kong: the Politics of a Global City (second edition, 2021), China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization (2018) and Yunnan – A Chinese Bridgehead to Asia (2013), and journal articles on subjects including the belt and road initiative (BRI), China’s maritime disputes, China and global governance, and Hong Kong.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
Company Directors:
Frank Slevin (Chairman)
Ollie Shiell (CEO)
Andrew Cainey
Dr. Winnie King
Advisory Board:
Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC (Chairman)
Angelica Anton
Sir Victor Blank
Sir Andrew Cahn KCMG
Ellie Chadwick
Rahul Sinha
Sir Tim Smit KBE
Benjamin Speyer
Kui Man Gerry Yeung OBE
Contact us at:
