What do the Taiwanese people want in relation to the P.R.C?
Themes: the history of Taiwanese cultural, social, and political identity; Taiwanese perceptions on democracy, the PRC, and Hong Kong; possible implications of Trump’s proposed policies on Taiwan.
Published: Sept 2025
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Response 1 of 3
Dr. Bi Yu Chang, Deputy Director of Center of Taiwan Studies and senior teaching fellow at SOAS
For over 400 years, Taiwan—with the exception of its native Austronesian inhabitants—has been settled by waves of immigrants from various regions of IndoChina brought to the island by displacement from wars and natural disasters on the mainland, commerce, and economic migration.
The inhabitants of Ilha Formosa, meaning “beautiful island” in Portuguese, have been the subjects of colonial occupations since the 17th century. From the Dutch, Ming rebels, Manchus, Japanese, and Chinese Nationalists, successive political authorities imposed their languages, customs, systems of governance, and conflicts that were foreign onto the local people and communities of the island. In essence, each regime instituted a foreign identity and purpose on the people of Taiwan that attempted to supplant the prior regime for their own, in order to control and govern the territory and its people.
These regimes did not allow the people of Taiwan—the Taiwanese people, which is inclusive of Hoklo, Hakka, and Indigenous persons residing on the island—to pursue their own identity, much less to govern themselves. Even in the case of the
Republic of China, the Chinese Nationalists, who shared a Han ethnic identity with the majority of the locals, had a vastly different political, historical, and collective memory spanning across continental China. The Chinese Nationalists relocated to the island only by crossing the Taiwan Strait after losing a bloody civil war and were detached from the local population’s political views, way of life, experience, and even language. In essence, the people of Taiwan had been essentially ruled by outsiders for the benefit of outside regimes for much of its political history.
However, following nearly four decades of martial law during the Cold War, the Chinese Nationalist regime began to politically liberalise in the 1980s. The bottom-up push by civil society for democratisation, plus the gradual topdown liberalisation by the central government, led to the reform and opening of the Taiwanese civic space and the development of institutions that protected political and human rights. This gave the governed a stake in governance, which had been suppressed or outright denied during all previous periods of colonial occupations.
The opening of the civic space in Taiwan in the late 20th century was the first instance of genuine democratic institution-building on the island and public participation in governance that was not reserved for a select class of people but for all segments of Taiwanese society—and at all levels of government. For the first time, the Taiwanese people were finally able to gain the agency to decide their political future through the democratic process.
On the social and cultural front, political liberalisation also led to the loosening grip of state control over cultural industries. Independent literature, art, journals, and even music within Taiwan had been heavily regulated and censored by the Nationalist Chinese government during martial law. The authoritarian regime feared cultural industries because they were independent mediums for creative expression that were difficult to regulate and viewed suspiciously as potential mediums for political dissent—which they were.
The loosened state grip on cultural industries led to a flourishing of different political views and cultures within Taiwan, better reflecting the pluralistic nature of Taiwanese society than that previously sanctioned by the state and by its preferred narratives. This development also began the process of weaving the national social and political fabric – not limited to people’s immediate communities as defined by ethnicity, class, faith, or that of the previous ruling political class— this can be credited to the rise of “Taiwanisation.” This manifestation of “Taiwanisation” extended beyond the political realm because it was ingrained in the social fabric—which also provided a stronger political foundation—represented in a growing interest and identification of Taiwan food, history, society, literature, and language.
The most representative manifestation of the Taiwanese people’s agency to decide their future began in 1996 with the people’s right to directly elect their president. The ability to directly elect presidential candidates who represented different political parties and pathways for the nation finally gave the people the right and say to decide their future—and not by the dictate of unaccountable political authorities.
Over time and with each successful election, this condition made for the emergence of civic-based nationalism within Taiwan that aligned the people’s belief in leadership not to a
particular personality or party in charge, but to an institution and the broader community. More importantly, this civic-based nationalism is distinguished from the ethnic-based or even party-statecentred nationalism that had been imposed on the people by prior political authorities. For once, the Taiwanese people were their own rulers.
From the early 1990s onwards, the Taiwanese people have been engaged in a political experiment to build a community based on their real shared experiences and to forge a common vision for the national future. With each democratic election and wave of new immigrants, the people of Taiwan are asserting their sovereign right to shape and decide their own future. Not the past or an imagined community by a handful of people driven by a distant memory— or more importantly by a foreign party and government that never exercised any authority over the people of the island.
While a natural impulse for greater autonomy and self-determination have always been undercurrents in Taiwanese politics, these urges have grown stronger because of the shocks of external events in recent years.
The squashing of political dissent in Hong Kong by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2020 despite the Sino-British Joint Declaration and promise of a “high degree of autonomy” has laid bare the clear and unacceptable risks of any agreement with Beijing that may purport to respect the democratic political rights that the Taiwanese people currently enjoy. In addition to China’s escalating military provocations and aggressive coercion directed against Taiwan, the invasion of Ukraine by revanchist Russia has awakened the Taiwanese people to the authoritarian’s penchant for and the reality of war in the 21st century. The people of Taiwan do not want to be the next Hong Kong or Ukraine.
However, after nearly three decades of democratisation, eight presidential elections, and three peaceful transfers of political power between political parties, the people are rightfully proud of their political accomplishments and naturally want to preserve their democratic way of life. This life stands in sharp contrast to the growing authoritarian system across the Strait – which also contributes to a waning identification with a greater China identity among the Taiwanese population.
The trend is evidenced by how in 1992 only 17.6% and 25.5% identified as Taiwanese and Chinese, respectively. At the end of 2023, 61.7% and 2.4% identified respectively; whereas 32% identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese.
Despite the persistent push for greater autonomy and selfdetermination in Taiwanese politics, these sentiments are also increasingly tempered by pragmatism and a shared sense of global responsibility for peace and stability. This trend is evidenced by the fact that in 2023 the overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan at 88.8% prefer to maintain some form of the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait from 71.9% in 1992. Most notably, only 3.8% and 1.2% want independence or unification immediately, respectively. An important nuance can be uncovered in the fact that among those who prefer the “status quo,” the percentage of people who would like to maintain this “status quo indefinitely” rose from just 9.8% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2023.
Despite the persistent push for greater autonomy and selfdetermination in Taiwanese politics, these sentiments are also increasingly tempered by pragmatism and a shared sense of global responsibility for peace and stability. This trend is evidenced by the fact that in 2023 the overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan at 88.8% prefer to maintain some form of the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait from 71.9% in 1992. Most notably, only 3.8% and 1.2% want independence or unification immediately, respectively. An important nuance can be uncovered in the fact that among those who prefer the “status quo,” the percentage of people who would like to maintain this “status quo indefinitely” rose from just 9.8% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2023.
About the Author
Russell Hsiao is the executive director of GTI, senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum. He is a former Penn Kemble fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy and visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo’s Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia.
He previously served as a senior research fellow at The Project 2049 Institute and national security fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies.
Prior to those positions he was the editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation from October 2007- to July 2011 and a special associate in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.
Response 2 of 3
Dr. Bi-Yu Chang, Deputy Director of the Centre of Taiwan Studies and Senior Teaching Fellow at SOAS
Since Taiwan’s democratisation in the 1990s, the relationship between Taiwan and China has become increasingly tense, evident through intensified grey zone military manoeuvres towards Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Taiwan’s increasing international isolation. Under Beijing’s two-handed strategy (both coercing and enticing), Taiwan risks not only losing its few remaining official allies but also faces increasing challenges to the current crossstrait status quo.
Many commentators have debated whether Taiwan is truly “the most dangerous place on Earth,” a phrase popularised by a 2021 article in The Economist. The Taiwan issue is indeed often considered a possible trigger for war between the United States and China. Accordingly, whenever cross-strait tensions are heightened, Western media frequently ask why the Taiwanese cannot simply accept the Chinese embrace and ease the regional tensions. This reasoning typically follows Beijing’s narrative: “Given that both sides share the same cultural heritage and languages, why are Taiwanese unwilling to accept the ‘one-China principle,’ recognise themselves as Chinese, and accept that Taiwan belongs to China?”
While many countries acknowledge the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) longstanding claim that “Taiwan has always been a part of China since ancient times,” they often fail to understand why the Taiwanese are so adamant about NOT becoming a part of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream.”
Given China’s economic might, countries worldwide aim to please Beijing. The general international perception of the Taiwan Strait conflict often blames Taiwan’s obstinance in acknowledging Beijing’s claim that the island has always been a part of China, thereby framing the issue as a Taiwan problem. Consequently, the conflict is attributed to Taiwan’s refusal to be brought under Chinese control. Such framing positions Taiwan as the source of mounting tensions in East Asia and the primary culprit in the potential conflict between the US and China.
As Michael Swaine and James Park warn, “Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A fullblown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility.” During Taiwan’s election periods, international media often repeat Beijing’s caution, warning Taiwanese people to be vigilant and ‘choose wisely’ between “peace and war,” as if Taiwan’s democratisation were the cause of cross-strait conflicts. This prevailing international discourse frames the cross-strait issue within the paradox of the ‘One China’ principle, unjustly portraying the victim as ‘troublemaker’ on the international stage.
In such an atmosphere, the question “What do Taiwanese people want?” is paradoxical. Although it initially sounds impatient and provocative, asking “what exactly do you want?” is a refreshing change from the usual approach of simply viewing Taiwan as the rebellious “troublemaker.” Instead, the focus is shifted to the Taiwanese, enquiring about their hopes and aspirations, and highlighting their subjectivity. This rare moment considers and respects Taiwanese identity, autonomy, and political values.
When reporting on rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Western media often describe Taiwan as a ‘breakaway province.’ However, since its founding in 1949, the PRC has never governed the Taiwan region. How can the Crossstrait division then be described as ‘secession’ or a ‘breakaway’? To outsiders, Beijing’s ‘One China’ principle and the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ proposal seem to promise peace and provide economic benefits riding on China’s growth. However, these same external expectations proved fatal in the case of Hong Kong. Moreover, would Western commentators ask Ukrainians the same question? Why would they refuse to accept Soviet rule and become part of powerful Russia? It would be unthinkable for the media in liberal democracies to ask victims to endure aggression and accept compromises, rather than demanding that the aggressor respect human rights and the people’s own will.
Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has peacefully and actively pursued democratisation and social reforms. More than thirty years later, Taiwan has become a thriving and mature democracy. Its peaceful political transition and the degree of civil liberties have become important indicators of democracy in East Asia. Although the process has been tumultuous, the Taiwanese cherish their democratic achievements and uphold liberal values, having become a model among the world’s new democracies. The performance of Taiwan’s political rights and civil liberties exceeds many Western countries (such as the UK, USA, and Germany). What makes the Taiwanese most proud, in addition to a life of equality and prosperity since the post-war era, is the treacherous path they have successfully taken towards democracy. Refusing to repeat past mistakes of authoritarian dictatorship, they strongly adhere to the principles of democratic freedom, while avoiding provoking the CCP. Today’s democratic success has been achieved through an almost impossible balancing act.
With Taiwan’s democratisation, Taiwanese identity has undergone a rapid and dramatic change. From initially identifying predominantly as “both Taiwanese and Chinese” in the early 1990s, [1] a dramatic shift occurred after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait missile crisis [2] and Taiwan’s first Presidential election in 1996. Beijing’s military threat, intended to influence the election outcome, backfired. As a result, the gulf between Taiwan and China grew. The group who identified as “Chinese only,” once the second largest category, shrunk rapidly and was replaced by the “Taiwanese only” identity. Starting from 2001, the both” and “Taiwanese only” identities were equally prominent until 2008 when the “Taiwanese only” identity became the majority, increasing from 48.4% in 2008 to 64.3% in June 2024. As for the “Chinese only” identity, it has been in the single digits since 2002, reaching 2.2% in June 2024. What does the trend tell us about what the Taiwanese want? The drastic identity shifts are not solely a reflection of the strong urge of the Taiwanese to assert their individuality and decide their own destiny but are also an indication of the clear growing anti-China sentiment.
In March 2014, in opposition to the Ma Ying-jeou government’s black-box operation attempting to pass the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) quietly in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwanese youth occupied the parliament for 23 days. This occupation and activism, symbolised by the sunflower during the protests, became widely known as the ‘Sunflower Movement.’ This young generation who dared to challenge authority and demand justice and equality was dubbed the ‘Sunflower Generation.’ The rise of this distinctive generation is another indication of a unique Taiwanese identity that aspires for a country of human rights and liberal democracy, distinct from a CCP-led China. Over the past decade, polls have shown that support for Taiwan’s independence among the Sunflower Generation is much higher than among older generations. Referred to as the ‘tianran du generation,’ they are seen as natural supporters of Taiwan independence. Unlike the older generation of Taiwanese independence activists who fought against the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) regime for democracy, the young tianran du generation grew up in a democratic and free society.
For them, democratic and liberal values are as natural and essential as air and water. Their self-identity is founded on the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Following the 2014 Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, the Taiwanese, especially the young people, grew increasingly suspicious of the PRC, indignant over Beijing’s high-handed crackdowns, and apprehensive about the future of Hong Kong and, by extension, Taiwan. Beijing’s ‘one country, two systems’ promise rings hollow, and the prospect of Chinese authoritarian rule threatens Taiwanese liberal democracy and their way of life. Against this background, Taiwanese resistance to Chinese claims is inevitable.
As a result, the prospect of materialising Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” to absorb Taiwan into China’s orbit is becoming increasingly remote, at least from the Taiwanese perspective. In recent years, Beijing has come to recognise the unreliability of relying solely on the KMT and has increased its inducements to Taiwanese businessmen and the general public. According to Lin Gang (2016), Beijing’s new Taiwan policy is heavily influenced by neo-functionalism, using economic incentives as a means to win hearts and minds, shifting the focus to Taiwanese people, especially the youth, by offering preferential opportunities for education and employment. Yet China does not realise that although its economic incentives are tempting, the values and self-identity of the Taiwanese cannot be easily bought with money, especially among the younger generation. Little wonder then that the Taiwanese young people have been described as Xi Jinping’s “lost generation”.
What exactly do Taiwanese people want? Just like you and me, the Taiwanese want to live a life that is peaceful, prosperous, and free. Beyond economic and material prosperity, what matters to the Taiwanese is maintaining liberal democracy and the values of freedom that have been built over the past thirty years. Faced with increasingly limited international space squeezed by Beijing’s isolation tactics, the Taiwanese also long for recognition on the international stage, which highlights a vital human need for recognition. As Charles Taylor (1992, pp. 25-26) aptly points out, “nonrecognition or misrecognition” is “a form of oppression” and shows “a lack of due respect… [which is] not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.” Indeed, what the Taiwanese want is basic dignity and human rights. They want not only to maintain the status quo of freedom and democracy but also wish that the international community respect their fundamental human rights, allowing Taiwanese to be Taiwanese.
Footnotes:
[1] The most reputable surveys on Taiwanese political attitudes have been conducted by the Election Study Centre (ESC) at the National Chengchi University since 1992. The most important and consistent surveys include ‘Taiwanese identity’ and preference for either ‘Taiwan independence’ or ‘unification with China.’ When the survey started in 1992, according to ESC (2024), 46.4% of the respondents identified themselves as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese.’ People who identified themselves as ‘Chinese only’ were over ¼ while those who identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese only’ took up only 17.6%. ESC, 2024. “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06~2023/12).” https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Deta il?fid=7800&id=6961.
[2] Ibid. After the 1995-96 missile crisis and Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, there was a drastic shift in how people identified themselves. Although the identity of ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ was still dominant (49.3%), the significance of the other two groups reversed – the group ‘Taiwanese only’ (24.1%) overtook that of the ‘Chinese only’ (17.6%).
About the Author
Bi-yu Chang is Deputy Director of the Centre of Taiwan Studies at SOAS, University of London. She specialises in cultural politics in Taiwan, with her research primarily focusing on identity politics, nation-building, cultural politics, power, and knowledge reproduction. Her monograph Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan was published by Routledge in 2015. In addition, she has also edited and published works in various books and journals in both Chinese and English. Some of her recent publications include di Limes (2021); Positioning Taiwan in a Global Context: Being and Becoming (2019); Taiwan: From Language to Identity and Ideology (2018); Taiwan’s Contemporary Indigenous Peoples, (2019); Connecting Taiwan: Participation – Integration – Impacts (2018); and (2017). Her latest research article “Being and Becoming 21st Century Taiwanese: Generational Gap and Identity Shift“ will be published in Sulla via del Catai (forthcoming, 2024).
Response 3 of 3
Prof. Chien-min Chao, Ph.D. Chair Professor and Director of Graduate Institute for National Development and China Studies, Chinese Culture University, Taiwan Former Deputy Minister of Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China
What do the Taiwanese people want: Why Trump’s defence budget demands may turn out to be a blessing for the Taiwanese
A few days before being nominated to officially represent the Republican Party in the year-end American presidential election, Donald Trump narrowly survived an assassination attempt at a rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13th. But what was even more shocking to the people of Taiwan was Trump’s interview with Bloomberg Businessweek released shortly after the assassination. In the interview, the former President states that Taiwan should pay the US for its defence as “it doesn’t give us anything.” In response, the Premier of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Cho Jung-tai said rather incoherently that Taiwan “is willing to shoulder more responsibilities.” Two days later, Robert O’Brien, a former national security advisor under the Trump administration and a candidate for Secretary of State should Trump win the election, stunned the people even more when stressing that Taiwan should be spending 5% of its GDP for defence. That’s about half of the island country’s annual budget.
From allowing the ractopamineenhanced US pork to be imported for political reasons, to shifting to a porcupine strategy for defence, to increasing the compulsory military service from four months to one year, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has been doing everything possible to woo the US, including encouraging the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) to invest in two manufacturing plants in Phoenix, Arizona. Dumbfounded by the aforementioned statements, a sense of betrayal is palpable in Taiwan. A recent survey conducted by the Brookings Institution also finds a divided opinion in Taiwan, with only 54.7% of the Taiwanese believing the U.S. would come to help in the event of a conflict with China.
Should Trump be elected President, it is unnerving to consider whether Taiwan will be able to keep its heavily coveted high-tech industry from being forced out or whether it will have to set aside an intolerable amount of resources for defence- at the expense of a more balanced development. However, there is a silver-lining: tensions in the Taiwan Strait might ease if Taiwanese politicians’ attitudes are more realistic and pragmatic.
Trump’s hyperbolic statements stem from the failure of the “responsible management” policy of the Biden administration to contain risks in the Taiwan Strait through erecting “guardrails”. Lieutenant General Stephen Sklenka, Deputy Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, said in a speech in Canberra in April that Chinese military drills in the straits of Taiwan in 2023 “practised manoeuvres key to an invasion of the island”. At a forum on July 2nd, former US deputy national security advisor Matt Pottinger argued that Beijing’s recent provocative actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea “were partly meant as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the invasion of Taiwan”. An authoritative Chinese scholar concluded recently in an academic meeting held by the Academy of Taiwan Studies of Xiamen University (which this author also attended) that the Chinese policy towards Taiwan is in a transition from “a peaceful unification but does not forsake the use of force” to that of “a forceful unification without forsaking the use of peace”.
Recently, the detention by the Chinese Coast Guard of a Taiwanese fishing boat operating in the waters near Kinmen islands and the promulgation of the “Opinions on Punishing ‘Taiwan independence’ Die-hards for Crimes of Separatism and Inciting Separatism in Accordance with Law” amount to a sea change in Chinese policy towards Taiwan. From the denial of ROC sovereignty — with PLA planes and vessels crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and the holding of military drills near the contiguous zones in the waters around Taiwan —to the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan proper, China is confidently showing that the Taiwan issue is an internal Chinese matter.
These developments unfold naturally from the stage laid down in Article Three of the Anti-secessionist Law, promulgated in 2005.
Not to be outmanoeuvred, President William Lai evoked a policy of “one China, one Taiwan” during his inauguration speech. The apparent aim was to demonstrate that legally “Taiwan is not part of China.” Yet, instead of clamping down on Lai, Biden sent Mark Lambert along with another deputy assistant secretary of state to Taiwan a month later to discuss “Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international organisations.” Moreover, Lambert openly criticised China’s mischaracterisation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and its false conflation of the resolution with its “One China principle”. The two democratic partners, Taiwan and the US, have hence been working strenuously to disentangle Taiwan from the ever-tighter cobweb weaved in the “One China” principle under Xi Jinping. Cross-Strait relations are edging dangerously close to an endgame in which the legal status of Taiwan is a defining issue.
Furthermore, geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers has intensified anti-China rhetoric in the US Congress, leading to a surge in
Taiwan-friendly bills passing through the legislative chamber. Suddenly, Taiwan finds itself in a position where a lot of favours are curried on its behalf – a level of support unseen since the severance of ties in 1979. In response to attacks from his Democratic opponents for being weak on China, President Biden has issued support publicly at least four times, stating that the US would come to Taiwan’s defence should China launch a military attack.
From President Lai’s controversial remark “When the president of Taiwan can enter the White House, the political goal we are pursuing will have been achieved,” made in July 2023, to the new cold-war rhetoric of containing China within the First Island chain, to the burgeoning alliances – CHIP, AUKUS and QUADand the even more elusive Asian NATO- some new form of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation-, many supporters of Taiwan’s independence seem mesmerised by this new round of fanfare arising from the new geopolitical dynamics.
To them, Taiwan is leading the charge in a sacred fight between likeminded democracies and an evil authoritarian expansionism.
This fight is not only morally justifiable but realistically feasible. Instead of stating with more nuance that the two sides/regimes of the Taiwan Strait do not subject to each other, these people opt for a more provocative “two states theory,” that the “PRC and ROC do not subject to each other”. Rather than claiming the ROC as a sovereign country these people thread a more dangerous “Taiwan as a sovereign” line.
In his inauguration speech, President William Lai took one step further and inched towards the “one China, one Taiwan” framework. Additionally, while addressing the DPP National Congress on July 21st, President Lai, who doubles as the party’s chairman, pledged to “bolster national identity based on Taiwan sovereignty,” thus braving the strong headwinds blowing in his direction since he took office two months ago.
Amid the brawl to beef up oversight powers of the Legislative Yuan (the congress)- which has emerged as the defining issue between the new Lai administration and the opposition KMT and TPP (Taiwan People’s Party)- DPP legislators frequently labelled their opponents as “Chinese agents” and “Xi Jinping’s representatives.”
A new policy from Trump, despite its destabilising and punitive nature, might act as a wake-up call, reminding the Taiwanese that America’s support is not boundless, and that Taiwan needs to fix problems with its giant neighbour on its own.
For Taiwan, a second Trump presidency rooted in “bargaining diplomacy” will not bode well and might even be terrifying. However, the “responsible management” policy championed by President Biden has harboured within the Taiwanese independence dreamers’ unrealistic imagination of a vision of a new and independent sovereign, protected by a US/Taiwan military alliance. In their view, if push comes to shove, America will defend Taiwan militarily to thwart China’s rise. Reconciliation with China would then be tantamount to surrendering; de-escalating and derisking are off the table. Whatever the mistakes they make, China is always there to take the blame.
In the latest presidential elections held earlier this year the ruling DPP party garnered only 40% of the popular vote. The party fared even worse at the Legislative Yuan elections by winning a mere 36% of the vote and controlling only 45% of the seats. One of the key factors contributing to the crushing defeat is Cross-Strait policy. A great majority of the Taiwanese people were not happy with the ruling party’s belligerent policies toward China. As the new hegemon in East Asia, China is using all its clout to bully Taiwan into submission. However, simply blaming China is not going to bring about the peace that a great majority of Taiwanese desire. Rather, Taiwan must reassess its approach and proactively reach out to China. Hopefully, Trump’s “America first” will help the Taiwanese recognise that they can not rely on America – the reality is that Taiwan needs to deal with China on its own.
In May 2021 the Economist described the Taiwan Strait as the most dangerous place on earth. As both regimes from across the Strait are gearing up for an ultimate showdown, preserving the peaceful status quo should be the top priority for all stakeholders!
About the Author
Chien-min Chao is the director of the Graduate Institute for National Development and Mainland China Studies at the Chinese Culture University, Taiwan. He is also the former Deputy Minister of Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan. His research interests are Chinese Communist Political System, PRC Government and Politics, Political and Economic Development in East Asia, Cross-Strait Relations of Taiwan and Mainland China.
Some of his published works are Can Xi Jinping Stop the Bureaucrats From Seeking Rents via Legislation, in Chinese Legality (2022) and Xi Jinping’s Policies Toward Taiwan After the Nine-In-One Elections (2015).
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