Themes: This issue explores current human rights issues in China; China’s perception of human rights; the implications a digital era has on this; how the UK could react and respond.
Concise commentary on complex issues from different points of view.
The UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme offers contrasting ‘short, sharp reads’ for those seeking a fuller exploration of key questions. This June 2021 edition explores the question:
“How is China’s approach to human rights evolving?”
Authors, alphabetically by surname:
- William Nee, Research and Advocacy Coordinator, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)
- Dr. Xueying ZHANG, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
How is China’s approach to human rights evolving?
William Nee
Research and Advocacy Coordinator
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD
September 2022
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
The Chinese government poses a challenge to the international human rights system. Faced with new economic and geopolitical realities, China’s strategic direction may be changing. British leaders must learn to coexist with China by maintaining strong red lines, not shying away from conflict and unpredictability, while being open to cooperating in areas of mutual concern and to support the global good. But to do this, it is important for UK policymakers to have a strong grasp of the facts about China’s human rights crisis. What follows are four crucial areas in China’s human rights abyss that UK policy makers and legislators should keep front and centre, as they consider policy decisions affecting UK’s relationship with China, and China’s role in the world.
First, the Chinese government has committed what both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have determined to be “crimes against humanity” in Xinjiang. Since 2017, Chinese authorities have committed systematic human rights atrocities in Xinjiang.
The government has arbitrarily detained up to an estimated one million Uyghurs and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in re-education camps. Survivors have reported systematic rape, torture, and deaths. Meanwhile, children of the detained are separated from their families and forcibly placed in orphanages. The Chinese government says that many camp detainees have now been released, but authorities have sentenced many people, including poets, writers, doctors, and other professionals, to long prison terms
Investigations have also uncovered mass transfers of detainees to forced labour in factories or to prisons. In August, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery issued a report that it was “reasonable to conclude that forced labour among Uyghurs, Kazakh, and other ethnic minorities in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing has been occurring in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”. On August 31, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released an assessment of the human rights
situation in Xinjiang that validated many concerns about the re-education system, widespread deprivation of liberty, torture and sexual violence in detention, family separations, structural factors that could lead to forced labour, and restrictions of freedom of religion. The report concluded that these policies may constitute crimes against humanity.
Second, Chinese human rights defenders remain at risk and human rights lawyers experienced nearly insurmountable difficulties using the law to defend their clients. Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) routinely documents human rights defenders who are detained simply for defending the legitimate rights of Chinese citizens, rights that are protected under international human rights law. Human rights lawyers have faced extreme difficulties: the government carried out a nationwide crackdown on human rights lawyers in 2015 that affected approximately 300 people.
According to research conducted by The 29 Principles, a UK-based civil society group, between January 2017 and October 2021, at least 43 defence lawyers and three law firms were penalised for their human rights work by having their licenses suspended, cancelled or revoked by judicial bureaus throughout China.
Third, the “high degree of autonomy” promised to Hong Kong, written into the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, has been effectively undermined. Since the National Security Law (NSL) took effect in 2020, the government has moved to crush all sources of pro-democracy energy in the city – even efforts that took purely peaceful forms
The UN Human Rights Committee, which recently reviewed Hong Kong’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), made some damning observations about the state of rights and freedoms in Hong Kong. It noted the “overly broad interpretation of and arbitrary application” of the NSL, which has to date been used to arrest over 200 people. The Committee found that certain provisions of the NSL “substantially undermine the independence of judiciary and restrict the rights to access to justice and to fair trial”. The Committee found that the way the law has been applied had unduly restricted a wide array of human rights guaranteed by the ICCPR. Most importantly, it recommended that the government take “concrete steps” to “repeal the NSL, and in the interim, cease applying the law”.
Fourth and finally, China’s international footprint and its position on the world stage has grown, as has its ambition, with profound ramifications for human rights outside of China. Xi Jinping has repeatedly said that he wants an international system with “the United Nations at its core.” And this system, according to Xi, would underpin “international law and the basic
norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.” But for Chinese officials, the “UN Charter” is often a euphemistic shorthand for prioritising state sovereignty above all else.
Xi Jinping has also laid out his “Thought” on human rights, which includes the notion that “subsistence and the right to development” are the most important human rights and that different civilizations can have different human rights standards. This position fundamentally challenges the notion of human rights as universal and inalienable; indivisible; interdependent and interrelated. In an initially secret document from 2013, Document #9, the Chinese Communist Party made clear that it abhors independent civil society, “universal values” (meaning human rights), and constitutional democracy.
China will undoubtedly continue to use its influence at the UN to undermine the human rights system and make it more relativistic. Meanwhile, China’s human rights repression has increasingly taken a transnational turn.
Uyghur groups and overseas dissidents have been targets, but there was even an attempt to disrupt a protest by the prominent young Australian activist Drew Pavlou outside of the Chinese embassy in London by falsely claiming his protest posed a bomb threat.
What are the implications of these facts – and how should UK policymakers react?
First, the UK should ensure that human rights are a priority in all of its policies with respect to China. As Ryan Haas, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia for the US National Security Council, recommends, in adapting US’s China policy, it is important to set red lines and communicate with clarity: “The more clarity Beijing has regarding the strength of…[and] conviction to uphold…long-standing interests, the less likely China will be to take actions that could court conflict by challenging them”, Haas advises.
The Chinese government should understand clearly that the UK intends to stand for the integrity of international human rights laws and standards.
This should include speaking out on Chinese human rights issues and individual cases; having UK diplomats in China attend trials of human rights defenders and activists and show their solidarity; and, crucially, shoring up support for international law and institutions at the UN and other international institutions.
Second, the UK should continue to pay attention to and show solidarity with Hong Kong. This should include continuing to issue robust and detailed six-monthly reports on Hong Kong, speaking out on Hong Kong human rights issues, and creating policies that tangibly help prodemocracy Hong Kongers, such as the offering of a visa route for British National (Overseas) and their dependents. Expanding such schemes would be a good move.
Third, and relatedly, the UK should listen to, protect, and gain insights from its diaspora. As journalist Joanna Chiu has noted, governments have often ignored warning signs about the Chinese Communist Party that the Chinese diaspora were well aware of. The Chinese government will likely step up its efforts to control the burgeoning Hong Kong community in the UK.
The UK has an obligation to protect these new residents and to welcome the opportunity to learn fresh insights from diaspora communities. Finally, it is important to note that not everything the Chinese government does overseas is inherently problematic, and there can be possibilities for cooperation in areas like climate change, development, infrastructure, and global health.
With that said, China has increasingly made such cooperation opportunities contingent on adhering to its selfdefined interests across the board. Thus, cooperation should not be seen as an end in and of itself, but rather as a means to facilitating other objectives. Nonetheless, signalling a willingness to cooperate – and not demonizing the Chinese leadership on a personal level – could be beneficial. As 2022 continues, and Xi seeks a third term as paramount leader at the 20th Party Congress, power will be more concentrated in his hands.
China faces a potentially destabilizing housing crash, economic fallout from its Zero-COVID policies and severe climate issues that could pose new grim realities for the leadership – and provide new impetus to cooperate. But those expecting a softening may be disappointed, as China increasingly seeks to align itself with Russia and counter the US and the West’s goals in general.
The direction the Chinese government chooses to take in the next year or two could be surprising, and the UK must be ready.
About the Author
William Nee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), where he carries out research regarding a wide array of human rights concerns impacting human rights defenders in China. Previously, Nee worked as a Business and Human Rights Analyst and China Researcher at Amnesty International, where he researched human rights abuses caused by multinational companies and focused on freedom of expression, censorship, criminal justice developments, and the death penalty in China. Before that, he was Development Director at China Labour Bulletin. Nee’s commentary has appeared in The Diplomat, Hong Kong Free Press, and Open Democracy.
Dapeng Chen received his Ph.D. degree in economics from Tsinghua University in 2019. He is currently a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research. His research interests cover corporate finance and international finance. He has published more than 10 academic papers in leading Chinese journals such as International Economics Review, China Soft Science and Nankai Management Review.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
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How is China’s approach to human rights evolving?
Dr. Xueying ZHANG
School of International Relations and Public Affairs
Fudan University
September 2022
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
The Ongoing Disputes on China’s Human Rights
The long-delayed UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on Xinjiang was finally released in the last minutes of Michelle Bachelet’s last day in office as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Bachelet’s successor, Austrian diplomat Volker Turk, then was left with a very hot potato to pick up.
The report got Beijing’s blunt denunciation and rebuttal, which called the report was ‘full of fabricated disinformation’ and questioned the credibility of the institution.
It was totally different picture 3 months previously.
When Michelle Bachelet wrapped up her six-day visit to China in May this year, many Western media outlets were ready to focus their attacks on China’s repression on human rights, especially against the Uyghurs, with the clichés and long-standing anti-China narrative.
Bachelet’s visit to China, however, proved to offer many positive signals.
In her post-visit statement, she cited China’s achievement in reducing poverty and eliminating extreme poverty ten years ahead of target date as a remarkable human rights achievement. She also spoke highly of China’s contributions in promoting multilateralism, financing for development and other areas of importance to human rights development, such as sustainable development, climate change and ecological protection. In this UN statement, when addressing the most politically contentious topic – whether Beijing’s policy toward Xinjiang is to combat terrorism and de-radicalisation or to commit genocide – Bachelet seemed to side with China.
Instead of blaming China, by using the western media term, ‘concentration camp’, Bachelet used an official Chinese term, VETC (vocational education and training centres), focused on redirecting people away from religious extremism and providing trainees with the professional skills necessary for them to re-enter society. Ma Zhaoxu, a Senior Chinese official and former vice Foreign Minister commented that Bachelet’s visit was an opportunity to experience the real Xinjiang at first-hand, a line that is at odds with US State Secretary Antony Blinken, who argued that Beijing was ‘manipulating’ Bachelet’s visit for propaganda purposes. According to OHCHR’s statistics, the institution is heavily relied on voluntary
contributions, where top 10 contributors are European countries, followed by the United States. Bachelet received strong criticism and huge pressure from the west after her visit. The European Commission’s spokeswoman expressed ‘regret’ on Bachelet’s visit; Nikki Haley, former US ambassador to the United Nations tweeted that Bachelet ‘should be fired’.
Bachelet’s changing attitudes and the choice to release the report on the last day of her tenure illustrate the complex power struggle behind the report.
Indeed, geopolitical tensions between the United States and China complicate human rights issues. China has long accused the United States of politicising human rights issues in order to discredit China’s achievements, delegitimise China’s political system and tarnish its global reputation.
China’s Conception of Human Rights
Who has the most to say about whether human rights in China are good or bad? In my humble opinion, it should be the Chinese people.
In a long-term polling study published in 2020 by Harvard Ash Center, researchers found that 95.5% of respondents were either ‘relatively satisfied’ or ‘highly satisfied’ with China’s central government. In contrast to these findings, the figure for the United States from a Gallup poll conducted that same year was only 38%. This is a striking difference. If China is a country without human rights, then why do its people support their own government so strongly?
In fact, since the publication of the first White Book of China’s Human Rights in 1991, China has gradually developed its views regarding the priorities for human rights that China believes and practices; the deficient aspects of the western human rights biases that China contests; and the shared values of human rights that China can advance within the international community.
From the Chinese perspective, the rights to subsistence and development are the most fundamental aspect of human rights, and poverty has been the primary challenge facing China for a long period. It would be well-nigh impossible for humanity to ensure any rights without the production and supply of goods.
In this regard, China upholds the human-centred approach and stresses the achievement of moderate prosperity（xiaokang, in Chinese）as the most effective guarantee for human rights.
In this context, China’s rapid economic development in recent decades has proven the effectiveness of this strategy. China completely eradicated extreme poverty by 2020, ten years ahead of the schedule set by the 2030 SDG Goals.
China’s contribution amounted to 70% of global poverty reduction. China has grown by leaps and bounds over the past few decades. In 2010, its GDP surpassed that of Japan to become the world’s second largest economy and this remains the position today. In 2020, the GDP of China and the U.S. stood at $15.8 trillion and $21.4 trillion respectively. In other words, China’s GDP was 74 percent of the U.S. and triple that of Japan. In 2021, the China’s per capita disposable income was $5,286, compared to only $51.6 in 1978 (the year China began its reform and opening up). Per capita disposable income has increased 100 times, and the overall living standards of the Chinese people have shifted from poverty to moderate prosperity.
During the last seven decades, China has transformed itself from a human rights exception to an active participant in global human rights governance.
China has signed and ratified 26 international human rights instruments (including the six major ones such as International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
China believes that human rights should be an inclusive concept, and that discussions on human rights should follow the principle of mutual respect.
China’s view is that the American and western perspective on human rights lacks balance, meaning that, although civil and political rights are emphasised, rights in regard to the economy, gender, education and environment deserve attention as well.
In that context, China actively promotes the development of the international human rights cause in a fairer and more inclusive direction. In 2017, the UNHRC adopted ‘The Contribution of Development to the Enjoyment of All Human Rights’ submitted by China in its 35/21 resolution, which introduced the concept of ‘promoting human rights through development’ into international human rights for the first time.
The UNHRC 2019 41/19 resolution stresses the importance of development in ensuring that ‘no one is left behind’ (a quite Chinese, people-centred philosophy ‘yigedoubunengdiaodui’.)
It recognises that development and human rights are ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ and affirms that ‘meeting the aspiration of the people for a better life is the priority of each state’. The above discussion is based on the understanding and development of human rights in China in physical space, also known among academics as the first to the third generations of human rights concepts. With the development of technology, the fourth generation of human rights concept, namely digital human rights, has gradually become the focus of discussion in recent years.
China’s Human Rights in the Digital Era
The first element is ensuring a more inclusive digital economy so that ‘no one is left behind’ in the digital age. The term ‘digital poor’ is used to describe those who are at risk of being left behind in the digital era when they are not digitally capable
The digital poor may refer to the elderly, the rural population, and to all the victims of inequalities caused by lack of digital capability. China is exploring ways to transform these groups from the digitally poor to the digitally rich.
E-commerce, for example, enables producers in rural areas to access and share information despite the constraints of space and time and to connect effectively with large, powerful markets so as to grow their incomes. E-commerce platforms such as Alibaba have significantly lowered the threshold for small and micro enterprises to connect to large markets. Many rural people, marginalised in terms of geographic location, access to information, and ability to develop, have increased their product sales and income by showcasing their agricultural products and handicrafts online through e-commerce and finding buyers.
In 2019, the National Comprehensive Demonstration Project of ECommerce in Rural Areas has helped nearly 3 million poor households increase their income. 832 poor counties nationwide achieved RMB 107.61 billion in online retail sales.
The second element is strengthening the security, protection and privacy of personal data. There is consensus between governments around the world on the need to enhance regulatory capacity and oppose monopolistic and unfair competition by tech companies. The EU’s 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the US’s 2019 National Security and Personal Data Protection Act proposal are good examples. While making life more convenient for people in the digital age, governments also need to reduce public concerns about risks to privacy and information rights.
Digital technology is a doubleedged sword. Digitisation not only brings benefits, it brings potentially a crisis of rights. Big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies bring benefits in terms of convenience, economic growth, cultural life enrichment and increased employment opportunities, but they also bring the risk of endangered privacy leak. Data protection and compliance is important for personal information and privacy (the micro-level) and for national security and the social public interest (the macro-level).
In December 2020, the China Central Economic Work Conference, a gathering of top leaders and policymakers to chart economic direction, highlighted the need to intensify anti-monopoly supervision over platform companies (such as Alibaba and Tencent) with regard to data collection and management. China’s legal system is catching up rapidly. A system of data protection compliance legislation has been legislated for at the basic legal level. Civil Law forms the core and the Cyber Security Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law form a parallel triumvirate. Last is the need to interpret the complexities between ‘digital human rights’ and ‘human rights’ in general.
Do digital human rights constitute an additional kind of right alongside the rights in politics, economy, society, culture and environment? Or does the digital space correspond to the physical space, so that all human rights issues discussed in the physical space can be projected onto the digital space? Regardless, in order to better address the new inequalities of the digital era, China could explore the establishment of a ‘governmentmarket-people’ tripartite governance mechanism to better respond to the challenges of digital poverty and digital privacy rights.
In the long run, China can have a more open and fair dialogue and collaboration with the international community in order to properly address not only the new forms of human rights issues that have emerged in the digital space, but also to explore how to improve human rights issues in a broader sense through digital technology.
About the Author
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
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