Themes: the security laws’ impact on UK-China relations; what the laws mean for Hong Kong’s population; how the security laws will impact Hong Kong and the rest of the world in the future.
Concise commentary on complex issues from different points of view.
The UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme offers contrasting ‘short, sharp reads’ for those seeking a fuller exploration of key questions. This May 2021 edition explores the question:
“What role does nationalism play in China today?”
Authors, alphabetically by surname:
- Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House
- Margaret Siu, Chair, Harvard Trade Forum, Harvard University & Brian Wong, Co-Founder, Oxford Political Review
- Dr. Zheng Wang, Director, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies Seton Hall University, USA
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
What role does nationalism play in China today?
Bill Hayton
Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Chatham House
May 2021
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
There is both good news and bad news about Chinese territorial claims. The good news is that there is a line around them; there’s no evidence that the Beijing leadership harbours ambitions for an ever-expanding Lebensraum.
However, the bad news is that there is a line around them and there is plenty of evidence that the Beijing leadership wants to assert total control over every scrap of land within it.
From the high Himalayas to the semisubmerged reefs of the South China Sea, China has asserted this line time and time again. Even now it seems determined to fly a Chinese flag over every barren hectare.
The ongoing cost of this exercise is astronomic, both in financial terms and to China’s international reputation.
A 2015 Chinese news report[1] put the cost of building one artificial island in the South China Sea at over $11 billion, and China has constructed seven of them in the Spratly Islands since 2013, along with others in the Paracel Islands.
These vast construction projects, together with other actions in the South China Sea, have alienated a considerable swathe of opinion in Southeast Asia and beyond. The annual survey conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore has shown a steady drop in affection towards China in recent years. The 2022 iteration of the survey found that well over half (58.1 percent) expressed either “little confidence” (33.3 percent) or “no confidence” (24.8 percent) in China to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance.
The situation with India is similar Confrontation in the Himalayas has cost China the lives of dozens of soldiers, along with the expense of maintaining garrisons and support infrastructure at high altitudes. Meanwhile, the proportion of Indians holding unfavourable views of China rose from 32 percent in 2015 to 46 percent in 2019, according to the Pew Research Center[3]. After clashes between soldiers from the two countries in 2020, Indian opinions moved even more negative.
Does Beijing care about any of this? It would seem not. General-secretary Xi Jinping’s repeated instruction to China’s media and diplomats to “tell China’s story well”[4] seems predicated on the idea that China’s behaviour is benign and that everyone else just needs to see the world from Beijing’s point of view. China’s public diplomacy shows no sign of being interested in opinions that run counter to the views in the Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai.
Within China, there is no public discussion about the nature, or the history, of these territorial claims or whether the cost of pursuing them is worth the result. Xi has raised the status of the claims to a nationalistic totem. In his speeches, what he calls the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’[5] will only be complete when every square centimetre of hillside and coral reef has been ‘returned’ to the motherland.
If you listen to the speeches of Xi and other Chinese officials, you might think that these pieces of land are ancient possessions of the Chinese nation. In 2010, State Councillor Dai Bingguo wrote that “China’s territory has basically been what it is today since the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 24).”[6] One of Xi Jinping’s main rhetorical themes is China’s “5,000 year-old civilisation” suggesting that these territorial claims may be even older.
A more detailed review of the history of these claims, however, demonstrates that they are not so much ancient possessions as twentieth century inventions. They very idea of hard and fixed borders was only introduced into East Asia by the European powers, Russia, Britain and France, as they extended (cont…)
their imperial domains. The Qing Great State, the Manchu empire that ruled most of East Asia from the midseventeenth century until the early twentieth, ruled through subordinates and proxies without any need for defined frontiers.
This was particularly true in Tibet, an autonomous ‘protectorate’ within the Qing Great State until it declared independence during the Chinese nationalist revolution. It was only after this, in 1913/14, that Britain, as the imperial power in India, and the Tibetan leadership attempted to define a precise border between them. This was rejected by the Chinese government of the time, and since.
The details are complex, but the broader point is that the disputed frontier dates only to this period. The claims in the South China Sea are even more recent. The first Chinese official to plant a flag in the Spratly Islands did so only in December 1946.
Objectively, therefore, the Chinese government is engaged in an expensive, reputationally-damaging effort to assert control over pieces of land that have minimal intrinsic worth and only became subject to a Chinese territorial claim as a result of a series of historical accidents over the course of the past century. Despite this, the Beijing leadership is doubling down on the very behaviour that has caused the world’s negative reaction. The question has to be ‘why?’
As I set out in my book ‘The Invention of China’,[7] this obsession with territorial sovereignty emerged from the collision of Western and Eastern ideas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The European idea of sovereignty was given a moralising twist when it was translated as the Chinese term zhuquan. Then, in the 1920s and 1930s, a discourse of ‘national humiliation’ was propagated by the ruling Guomindang party of Chiang Kai-shek as a means of generating popular loyalty to the Republic of China. Through schoolbooks, atlases and maps, the Guomindang sought to promoting feelings of anger and hurt about the alleged loss of Chinese territory in earlier epochs.
The result has been a reification of territory as a symbol of national redemption and pride. At present the primary focus of this reification is the island of Taiwan.
For all except four of the past 127 years, the island has been ruled by a different government to the mainland – fifty years under Japanese colonialism, 73 under a rival Chinese state. Up until the Second World War, most Chinese leaders, nationalist and communist, ignored Taiwan. There was even talk of a separate ‘Taiwanese’ nation.[8]
That, of course, has changed. There is a general assumption among Western analysts that Beijing intends to invade or otherwise absorb Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China before the state celebrates its centenary in 2049. Such an outcome would be the defining moment of Xi’s ‘great rejuvenation’. However, polls show[9] the people of Taiwan are strongly opposed to this outcome, less than two percent are in favour of unification with the mainland. Any attempt to change the status quo by force would pit the tide of Chinese nationalism against the firepower of the American and Japanese militaries, a potentially catastrophic conflict.
Much better, then, to dial down the political temperature, study the ‘accidental’ history of these territorial claims, recognise their fragility and agree to avoid conflict. From the South China Sea to the high Himalayas, an acceptance of the status quo, and a decision not to pursue maximalist territorial claims would be a major contribution towards regional peace. It would also precipitate a major change in global opinion towards China. By taking away the major cause of regional tension, the Beijing leadership would find its diplomatic and wider security objectives much easier to achieve. Such gains would far outweigh the value of isolated coral reefs or dusty mountain canyons.
References:
1.http://www.rmzxb.com.cn/c/2015-04-13/481720.shtml
2.The State of Southeast Asia: 2022 Survey Report https://www.iseas.edu.sg/category/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/
3.https://www.pewresearch.org/feature/global-abortion/
4.https://www.neican.org/xi-jinping-on-external-propaganda/
5.http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/
6.http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document
7.]Hayton, Bill ‘The Invention of China’ https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/978030026
8.Wachman, Alan M. ‘Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity https://books.google.co.uk/
9.https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?
About the Author
Bill Hayton is an Associate Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House in London and the editor of the academic journal ‘Asian Affairs’. In 2019 he received his PhD from the University of Cambridge for work on the history and development of the South China Sea disputes. Bill worked for the BBC for 22 years until January 2021 in a variety of broadcasting roles including periods with BBC World TV, BBC World Service Radio and the BBC News Channel. He spent 2013-14 on secondment to the public broadcaster in Myanmar working on training and development. He has written two books on China: ’The South China Sea: the struggle for power in Asia’ (Yale, 2014) and ’The Invention of China’ (Yale, 2020) and numerous articles on Asian issues.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
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What role does nationalism play in China today?
Margaret Siu
Chair, Harvard Trade Forum and Marshall Scholar
Brian Wong
Co-Founder, Oxford Political Review and Rhodes Scholar
November 2022
Chinese economic nationalism has morphed since the 1980’s
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Economic nationalism is best described as the deployment of economic means, including but not limited to subsidies and protectionism of particular firms; boycotts and pressure campaigns by consumers; and heightened barriers to entry for foreign capital and investors, to shore up a political agenda that bolsters a nationally oriented sense of belonging and pride (see Gerth 2012 [1], Helleiner 2020 [2]).
The Historical Origins and Trajectory of Economic Nationalism in China
China is no stranger to economic nationalism. State-driven, export-driven mercantilism – first touted by Sun Yatsen – came to underpin Deng’s approach to reform and opening-up. Whilst China shifted towards greater privatisation and decentralisation in the 1980s, the 1990s saw state-driven, topdown investment into infrastructural growth (Huang 2010)[3] and carefully controlled deregulation of markets, complemented by an assertive brand of nationalism. Indeed, economic nationalism helped pave the way for China’s economic rise and subsequent accession to the WTO in 2001, while mollifying domestic citizens.
China’s economic take-off gave its people confidence in its culture, political system and economy. The notion of a robust, resilient Chinese people that could “say no” to Western ideals and beliefs began to reassert itself. And the emphasis on domestic consumption and production to drive economic growth increased China’s confidence in its quality of manufacturing. Consumers increasingly made spending decisions based on national pride and interest.
The Hu-Wen administration of the early 2000s placed an emphasis on social stability and cohesiveness through a ‘harmony’-driven governing ethos. During this time, grassroots nationalism ebbed and flowed – though it was always carefully managed by the ruling authorities. The government wanted to keep nationalism in check to continue China’s economic growth. Where there were nationalistic outbursts resulting from perceived affronts to national sovereignty, the Chinese state deftly embraced a mixture of censorship and rhetorical downplaying to mollify mass sentiment.
An illuminating account of this is offered by Zhao 2008[4], who argues that the Chinese state in the late 1990s and 2000s sought to both harness and rein in domestic nationalism in justifying and supporting its foreign policy.
Consider the mass boycotts and protests against Japanese goods[5] in August and early September 2012. What had begun as reactive protests against the Japanese governmentinitiated purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, escalated into targeted and violent attacks on Japanese businesses and firms within China. Heiwado, a Japanese department store in Changsha, was sacked and looted[6].
Viewing public outrage as having done enough to establish the government’s stern displeasure at Japan’s unilateralism, provincial and local governments moved swiftly in midSeptember to break up the protests and quell the broader civil unrest through harsh, punitive measures.
The Chinese government was cognizant of the double-edged sword that citizen nationalism presented. On the one hand, it serves as a signalling function to foreign governments concerning matters of strategic interest. On the other hand, nationalistic protests that persisted without restraint could lead to effects on public order and have dangerous spill-over implications for China’s relations with neighbouring countries and foreign companies.
China needed foreign firms to enter and invest into China. This case demonstrated how excessive public bellicosity would do neither the government nor the people any favours.
The Rise of A More Assertive Economic Nationalism
Fast forward a decade, China’s domestic response to foreign economic players has markedly shifted.This is due in part to China’s significant economic advances over the past decade and in part to an increasingly trenchant foreign policy driven by an ideological and visionbased purity. Bellicosity and animosity towards the West are scaling new heights. There exists a growing population amongst Chinese youth (though by no means representative of all in the generation) who view China’s rise as inevitable and the West’s weakness as demonstrative of both its moral and geopolitical failings. Brown (2021) in China in Five Cities: from Hohhot to Hong Kong, and Fish (2017) in his China’s Millennials: The Want Generation provide excellent accounts of these Chinese millennial attitudes.
Growing racism and tensions between Chinese migrants and students in the West and their host countries have bolstered the sentiment that China is under siege from powers that are hostile to its rise. The nationalistic attitudes and speech-acts of Chinese consumers, citizens, and certain diplomats in relation to economic activities have only increased in ferocity.
China’s approaches to foreign businesses and its handling of economic nationalism have shifted considerably over the past decade. Far greater emphasis is now placed on the policing of the ideological and political stances (as regards to Chinese affairs) of domestic and foreign brands competing in Chinese markets. Moreover, the consumer base is more openly nationalistic than before.
Observers often note that growing nationalism has raised costs for foreign firms operating in China, making the country less attractive to multinationals. In 2017, Korean conglomerate Lotte Group agreed to allow the US and South Korea to deploy an antimissile system on Lotte-owned land in Korea.
As a result, the company became the subject of Chinese economic reprisals. Hackers targeted Lotte’s website. Chinese customers, business partners, and local authorities organised a widespread boycott of the company’s products and services and launched audits and investigations. Ultimately, Lotte decided to leave China completely.
Western apparel and footwear companies have been particularly affected by controversy over the use of Xinjiang cotton. Firms that stopped using Xinjiang cotton have been met with vociferous opposition and costly boycotts from Chinese consumers[7].
In 2021, Chinese social media became flooded with angry messages after Nike said[8] it was “concerned about reports of forced labour” in Xinjiang and stated that the company would no longer purchase textiles from there. Nike’s revenue in China decreased by 9% from 2021 to 2022. With rising pressure to declare a public stance – particularly on China’s core interests such as Taiwan and Hong Kong – large multinationals feel increasingly pulled in different directions by their Chinese and western consumers.
Three main reasons for more assertive economic nationalism in modern China
The first reason is the ideological orientation of the Chinese government under President Xi Jinping, who views territorial integrity and national security as overarching priorities. While the contribution to economic growth that foreign companies bring remains important, it is by no means the most important factor to the current leadership. Ensuring that companies adhere to Chinese positions on what China sees as its core interests is paramount.
So while boycotts and mass pressure campaigns may make companies uneasy, they also work in enforcing broad compliance with ideological lines. Earlier this year, a Chinese company, Miniso, which has openly co-opted the aesthetics of Japanese retailers Uniqlo and Muji, faced substantial backlash from consumers. Many found the cultural mimicry inappropriate, given the historical animosities between China and Japan. The company has since profusely apologised[9] for pretending to be a Japanese brand and thereby offending Chinese consumers. Miniso has promised to “export the correct Chinese culture and values.” This is an example of the effectiveness of consumer pressure and boycotts. The second aspect is that the economic calculus of the Chinese state has shifted in reaction to China’s heightened demand-side leverage as its economy has grown. The Chinese consumer market is simply too large to miss out on. Estimates by MacroPolo, a think tank, [10] suggested that between 2020 and 2025 another 240 million.
citizens are likely to reach middle income status, bolstering the size of China’s middle class to 650 million by 2025. Indeed, Starbucks recently declared its intention to increase its number of stores[11] in China, its second largest market, from 6,000 in 2022 to 9,000 by 2025.
The final reason is that China is more self-sufficient now. China is less dependent than it was ten to fifteen years ago on the provision of quality goods and services by foreign firms. Lotte’s departure left no gap in the market – Chinese retailers are anyway much more successful in understanding the needs of local consumers. Under his Dual Circulation Strategy[12], Xi Jinping has placed greater emphasis on “increasing selfsufficiency in essential industries through improved innovation” and “becoming a worldwide manufacturing hub of high-valueadded goods”.
China is perhaps less concerned about the exit and withdrawal of foreign firms, as companies of its own, with greater controllability and dependence upon the Chinese state, rise to the challenge.
Conclusion
The rise of economic nationalism in China is to some extent understandable: whether it be from the country’s economic rise since reform and opening-up or from historically rooted grievances at perceived infringements upon China’s territorial sovereignty. Yet Chinese decision-makers must also recognise that assertive economic nationalism is a risky gambit. In time, growing popular sentiment may eventually come to hamper the Chinese state in its ability to attract and open up its economy further to foreign firms, bringing valued investments and capabilities. For now, however, nationalistic sentiments have seemingly won the argument.
References:
1.https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28183/chapter-abstract/213090558?
2.Helleiner, Eric, ‘The Diversity of Economic Nationalism.’ https://www.tandfonline.com/’doi/full/10.1080/135
3. Huang, Yasheng. ‘Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington Consensus.https://www.jstor.org/stable/25682397
4. Zhao, Suisheng ‘Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications.’https://sites01.lsu.edu/faculty/voegelin/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2015/09/Suisheng-Zhao.pdf
5.https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/china-online-warriors-red-guards/
6.https://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/17/business/chi
7.https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_releas
8.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56519411
10.https://macropolo.org/analysis/china-economy-forecast-2025-eluding-the-middle-income-trap/
12.https://chinapower.csis.org/china-covid-dual-circulation-economic-strategy/
About the Author
Margaret Siu is a JD candidate at Harvard Law School, where she chairs the Harvard Trade Forum and studies the legal aspects of US-Chinese crossborder dealmaking. She earned her M.Sc. degrees from University College at University of Oxford and the London School of Economics and Political Science as a Marshall Scholar. In the past, she researched for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is also on the board of advisors for the Oxford Silk Road Society and is the Chair of Apricity Magazine, an international award-winning arts magazine. Siu has guest lectured at TEDxYouth@Austin, the University of Texas at Austin, and Beijing Foreign Studies University.
Brian Wong is a geopolitical strategist and advisor publishing extensively on Sino-American relations, statecraft in Asia, and public policy. A Hong Kong Rhodes Scholar (2020) and third-year DPhil in Politics at Balliol College, Oxford, they graduated with a Distinction in the MPhil in Politics at Wolfson College, University of Oxford, and First Class Honours from Pembroke College, University of Oxford with a BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Brian also currently sits on the Advisory Board to OxStu, the largest Oxfordbased student newspaper. As a columnist for the Hong Kong Economic Journal and the Editor-atLarge for ThriveGlobal, they write regularly for publications such as TIME, Foreign Policy, Aeon, Financial Times, and The Diplomat.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos.
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
Follow UKNCC on Twitter:
@UkCommittee
Or Linkedin at:
linkedin.com/company/ukcommittee
What role does nationalism play in China today?
Dr. Zheng Wang
Director, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
Seton Hall University
November 2022
The UK National Committee on China (UKNCC) Guest Contributor Programme highlights contrasting responses, by leading authors, to key questions posed by the UKNCC. The programme is designed to stimulate a deeper exploration of China related issues; drive curiosity; and test conventional wisdom.
Contact us at:
perspective.ukncc@pm.me
Nationalism has been a well-discussed topic in China over the past few decades.
However, there are different definitions of the term. Nationalism is often seen in the US and by scholars as a negative thing. However, 民族主义 (minzuzhuyi – nationalism) is not always seen negatively in China. It is often seen as a positive force to keep people together and make them stronger for positive social change. Indeed, Sun Yatsen used nationalism as one of his Three Principles of the People.
When we think of nationalism, we often think of demonstrations and many people on the streets, such as during the Diaoyu-Senkaku crisis in 2012, when citizens in over 100 cities in China came out to burn Japanese cars and protest.
Scholars have analysed how nationalism shaped their attitudes and behaviours. Over the past 10 years, we have seen a further rise in nationalism in China. This is related to China’s recent achievements and a belief that China is or is going to become number one.
We have also seen the collapse of the US-China relationship, with new sanctions on and criticisms of China. So Chinese nationalism is somewhat ‘responsive’ and China believes it is responding to foreign ‘aggression’ and ‘criticism’. This is particularly so in relation to Covid-19, such as Trump calling it the ‘Chinese-virus’ and many American politicians and media airing very strong criticisms of China. When they criticised China, their target was primarily the US domestic audience, not China. But this rhetoric reaches China, and the Chinese propaganda ministry very skilfully uses this criticism of China to mobilise people. Their actions have been very successful.
How was nationalism used in the 1990s post Tiananmen?
After the Tiananmen student movement, China, like today, also faced stern criticism from the US and the West. The government faced a crisis of legitimacy and in the people’s faith in the communist ideology.
So the government began to use nationalism as the new ideology or at least to fill the vacuum of ideology.
Today’s nationalism is a continuation of this process of using nationalism as ideology to hold the country together. Before that, during Deng’s leadership, he tried to suppress nationalism in order to boost relations with the outside world, especially the Western countries, to achieve the economic reforms he desired.
So the 1990s involved a major transformation in the use of nationalism in China, of which we see the consequences of today. Today’s young people have spent their whole education during a period of rising nationalism. They have received ‘patriotic education’ from kindergarten to college. Many believe today’s young people are more nationalistic than young people 20 to 30 years ago. They are more focused on China’s strategic objectives and have more negative views towards the US and Europe.
Is there a contradiction between the CCP’s use of communism and nationalism?
Communism theory and ideology contradicts nationalism, and it is more concerned with class struggle and social equality. During the Cultural Revolution, the CCP emphasised internationalism and class struggle over China’s national interest. In a major shift in policy, the CCP started to use nationalism as a tool for legitimacy and ideology post-1989.
Nationalism is an effective tool to use. This can be demonstrated by the rise of Donald Trump in the US and the way he employed nationalism and populism to get into power.
How does China use World War II as legitimacy for nationalism today under the CCP?
The CCP’s belief is that only it can save and liberate China and it claims that China’s achievement of national independence and the end of national humiliation are due to the CCP. In recent years, there have been more publications and TV shows of the events of World War II. Compared to the 1960s and the 1970s, there are now many more references to the contributions of the Kuomitang (KMT) to the war victory. Previously, to justify the CCP’s rule, the government emphasised the KMT’s corruption and claimed that China couldn’t have achieved its independence without the CCP. Nowadays, more and more publications, popular culture, and movies have given people more information about the history and the KMT’s role in the victory: and have deemphasises the contradictions between the CCP and KMT as they both defended Chinese national interest.
Moreover, over ten years ago, this was done partly to improve relations with Taiwan and gain credit with the KMT administration there. But relations between the mainland and Taiwan have changed since then and this is no longer an effective strategy.
How does China use popular media to promote nationalism?
The CCP believes that just modifying school education alone is insufficient, and they have extended the “Patriotic Education’ campaign more deeply into popular culture, entertainment, and many parts of daily life. Moreover, school education and textbooks play a much more important role in China than in other countries as almost all schools in China use the same textbooks published by the official press.
In other countries, different schools have more choice over the curriculum. What is new in the last 5-10 years is the use of social media to promote ‘Patriotic Education’. This also includes censorship and the flow of information to make sure people only see approved information. This extends to control of the content of movies and TV shows to expose people to the official narrative of history.
What is the difference between nationalism in China and nationalism in other countries?
Nationalism in China is primarily externally oriented, focused on enemies from outside.
American nationalism led by Trump is not only that, but also focused on the domestic. And this has created division at home. The rise of nationalism in the US has also shaped its policies towards China. Many recent US policies towards China have not been in the US interest, but have been implemented with the intention of hurting China and being strong and tough to please a domestic political audience. The policies have hurt China, but have hurt the US too.
Nationalism makes people irrational and make decisions against their own interests. The intention becomes hurting the enemy rather than helping oneself.
We are now seeing the interaction between the nationalism of the US and China and how it has contributed to the collapse of the bilateral relationship, leading to the potential of conflict between the two. The current relationship is in my opinion, a ‘Shakespearean tragedy’.
Both countries have common interests and responsibilities, but nationalism plays a very important role in the US and China that has led them to confrontation. It has become a competition in the US Congress on who can be most harsh on China.
In the past, Chinese nationalism has About the UKNCC long been focused on Japan due to its historical relationship and Japan’s war crimes in World War II. In recent years, China’s nationalism has shifted its focus. Nationalism is no longer solely focused on Japan, and attitudes among the general population have improved towards Japan. Japan and China’s other neighbours have a more balanced policy to China than the US, so nationalism has become more focused on the US.
What is the main source of CCP legitimacy, nationalism or economic growth?
The CCP’s legitimacy post-Tiananmen comes from firstly, economic growth, the improvement of living standards, and secondly, nationalism. With the economic slowdown, China’s development faces many challenges, internal and external. This includes the pandemic and China’s ‘Zero-covid’ policy. So when the government cannot supply further economic growth or if people’s living standards stop improving, or even start to decline, nationalism might have to play an even more important role in supplying legitimacy for the CCP. For the party, the educational campaign’s most important messages are that only the CCP can make China an independent, united, powerful and wealthy state, and only the CCP can defend China’s national interests and meet foreign competition and hostility. These rising nationalist sentiments are further stimulated by US policy towards China, such as sanctions on Chinese tech companies and actions regarding Taiwan and Hong Kong.
About the Author
Dr. Zheng Wang is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) and Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. He is also an Abe Fellow of the Social Science Research Council and Japan Foundation. Dr. Wang is the author of the book Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (Columbia University Press, 2012). This book received International Studies Association’s “Book of the Year Award” in 2013.
About the UKNCC
The UKNCC is designed to help the people of the UK make clear sighted decisions on their engagement with China. In an era of an exponential rise of misinformation and uninformed debate, our aim is to differentiate ‘the noise’ from robust, evidenced and well constructed information. We highlight high quality commentary and research and support those who are already, or could become Britain’s leading talents on China.
The current debate on China in the UK is too often dominated by ‘hawks’ and ‘apologists’. This can lead to over simplification and poor decision making.
The UKNCC seeks to promote a broader, nuanced debate without entertaining extreme views or perpetuating false silos
Disclaimer:
The views expressed in the UKNCC Guest Contributor Programme are of each author and do not
represent those of UKNCC as an organisation or of any individual associated with it.
Copyright © 2024 UK National Committee on China CIC (Company number 13040199) All Rights Reserved.
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